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Abstract 
This project consists of two complementary studies exploring structural challenges of the United 
Nations through a case study of the Middle East and North African states. The research focuses 
on the major organs of the General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and 
Human Rights Council to analyze and assess their representativeness and legitimacy. The project 
is framed as supportive of increased diverse representation in order to provide legitimacy to 
organs and policies within the United Nations. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
The representativeness and structure of the United Nations is an important model for the world. 
The United Nations is an important actor in global governance as it responds to international 
crises, keeps peace in conflict-stricken locations, and distributes aid all over the world. If the 
current United Nations system is unrepresentative, especially in handling dire security issues 
around the world, this could hurt the organization’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the structure of the 
organization should be reconsidered. This project focuses on two major structural constraints 
within the United Nations that affect state members and the representation of interest. First, the 
creation of the United Nations is a result of post-World War II politics and does not reflect the 
current state of world politics. Second, the United States has a difficult reformation process 
which has allowed this outdated model of representation to persist. We can use the Middle East 
and North African states as examples of countries that are hindered by these flaws.  
This project contains two studies: the first study focuses on understanding how the 
Middle East and North African states function as a region within the United Nations system. The 
second study uses a set of case studies of MENA and Permanent Five States  to see if the 
‘MENA identity’ is unique within the UN system. The studies also focus on major organs of the 
United Nations: the General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and 
Human Rights Council in order to analyze and assess their legitimacy in regards to regional 
representation.  
The first study addresses two main questions: Does the Middle East / North Africa “speak 
with one voice,” and is that voice distinct from Africa and Asia? Are Middle East and North 
African states currently advocating for a designated Security Council seat? Would a Middle East 
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/ North Africa Security Council seat enhance representativeness and degree of democracy based 
on the current system of election? 
The Middle East / North African states joined the United Nations fairly recently, due to 
the decolonization of many MENA states from the middle to end of the 20th century. Because of 
this late independence, many UN bodies, such as the Security Council, do not recognize the 
Middle East / North Africa as a region. These states are divided into African and Asian regional 
groups, and therefore are unable to elect representation specifically for the Middle East and 
North Africa region. While there are consistent Security Council seats specifically set aside for 
Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, there are none set aside for the Middle East and North 
Africa. These states must represent the continental interests as opposed to their regional interests. 
The UN Security Council was created to “maintain international peace and security,” and 
is one of the most prominent bodies of the United Nations. I found the lack of a recognized 
Middle East and North African ‘voice’ to be a major problem in the Security Council, as many 
issues of international peace and security persist in the Middle East / North Africa. My proposed 
solution to this problem was for the Security Council to recognize this ‘voice’ and implement a 
consistent Middle East and North African seat in order to potentially be more effective and 
representative in solving issues in the region.  
However, I feel that proposing a Middle East and North African seat is crucial in 
researching if the Middle East and North African states have a common regional identity within 
the UN system that warrants a separate seat. Perhaps the Middle East and North African states fit 
well in their current African and Asian groups. The United Nations General Assembly Debate is 
a yearly forum where state representatives discuss  the issues they want the United Nations to 
prioritize in the upcoming year. To discern if this regional identity exists, I researched the 
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General Assembly Debates from 2009-2016 for the Middle East and North African states to see 
if these states prioritize similar issues, especially those that are regional topics. I chose this 
timeframe to test if the region was unified during the turmoil of the Arab Spring and Syrian 
Conflict. Additionally, I also looked at topics related to the current groups, Africa and Asia, to 
see if these issues were prioritized more consistently or often than the regional topics. 
Along with this, I examined the unrepresentativeness of the current system of Security 
Council election, especially for Middle East and North African states. I concluded that while a 
Middle East and North African seat would improve the current system of election and may 
improve the efficiency of the Security Council, reformation of the current United Nations 
structure is unlikely. However, I still advocate for a Middle East and North African seat, because 
the current system is unfair to these states. 
The second study expands on the questions and issues that were raised in the first study. I 
argued in the first study that the regional prioritization of certain topics was unique to the Middle 
East and North Africa; however, I expanded this study with other states to compare the 
prioritization of these topics. I also focused on Middle East and North African states within the 
UN organs of the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council. In addition, I 
conducted specific case studies of individual states to further study the weaknesses of the UN 
structure and threats structural flaws present to its legitimacy. 
The second study addresses three main questions. Do states outside of the Middle East / 
North Africa also prioritize the same regional topics in the General Assembly Debate, and if so, 
how strongly, and how does this speak to the uniqueness of the Middle East and North African 
identity? Is the current United Nations model of representation unsuitable to the Middle East and 
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North African states, or is it beneficial in certain organs? Do norms within the United Nations 
system affect states’ actions?  
From these studies, I concluded that the current United Nations structure does not allow 
for the most representative and legitimate system. Through the examination of the UN structure 
regarding the Middle East and North African states, it still seems that the current structure is not 
as democratic and as fair as it could be overall. 
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Introduction 
 
The United Nations was created in the wake of World War II, when a type of world governance 
was needed to replace the failed League of Nations. When the United Nations charter and 
structure were created, there were fewer states in the United Nations than there are now. Many 
states that are now members of the United Nations, specifically in the regions of Middle 
East/North Africa, Africa, and Asia, were not independent states when regional groups were 
developed, and could not advocate for regional seats in the Security Council. The few states from 
Africa that were independent at the time were supportive of the Pan-Africanism movement, so 
this combined with a Eurocentric perspective of Africa as a unified region, as opposed to a 
complex continent with several sub regions, has allowed this structure to persist. This may be the 
same for the Asian region as well, which also has many sub regions.  
 While the groups in the United Nations are mostly divided by region, a group such as 
Western Europe and Other (WEOG) is not defined by region, as it contains states in all different 
parts of the world, i.e. the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and more (UNITED 
NATIONS DGACM 2014). It can be observed that WEOG is an ideological grouping, not a 
common culture or geographical location. What this shows is that a Middle East and North 
Africa region unified by a combination of cultural and regional aspects is not unfeasible, but is 
not a part of the system due to long-persisting norms and outdated structure. 
For example, the UN Charter section about the Security Council states that election for 
the ten non-permanent seats would be voted on by the General Assembly and would be 
designated by “equitable geographical distribution” (UN Charter). Due to the vagueness of this 
language, a resolution was created in 1963 to specify how the non-permanent seats would be 
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divided. This resolution created the following designations for the composition of the non-
permanent seats: Two representatives from the Western Europe and Other group, one 
representative from Eastern Europe, three representatives from Eastern Europe, and seven 
representatives from Africa and Asia (General Assembly Resolution 1991). So although this 
resolution does acknowledge the expansion of UN membership, it was still enacted before many 
states, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, gained independence.   
Another aspect is that not only is the structure of the United Nations perhaps outdated, 
the reform process is also very difficult. To change the Security Council, it requires an 
amendment process, according to Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter. First, a “General Conference 
of the Members of the United Nations” must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the 
General Assembly and nine Security Council members for reviewing the Charter. The proposed 
amendment must be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly, and ratified by respective 
states’ processes by two-thirds of UN members, which must include all of the P5 members 
(Charter of the United Nations 1945). While this is just one case, it can be seen that in order to 
make significant changes to the United Nations it requires support of an overwhelming amount 
of states to even be considered, much less approved. This is not only a long-persisting structure, 
but it is also one that cannot easily be reformed. 
All of this matters because the United Nations is a long-lasting structure in an ever-
changing world with increasingly complex conflicts. I question if aspects of this structure are as 
effective as they could be. Currently, parts of the Middle East and North Africa are in complete 
turmoil, and yet this region cannot elect an official representative to the Security Council, the 
body that “maintains international peace and security” (United Nations Security Council 2016). 
There are states that use the structure to remain powerful or project an image on the world stage. 
3 
 
 
There are persisting crises around the world, and it is important to examine how effective and 
efficient the current systems are. I find in this project that aspects of the United Nations benefit 
the Middle East and North Africa in some instances, but in other instances do not, but all of these 
show the ineffectiveness of the United Nations.  
This project encapsulates two studies, which analyze different aspects of the United 
Nations structure. The first study is a general case study of the Middle East and North African 
states in the UN system. This study specifically focuses on how the current United Nations 
structure, specifically with the Security Council, is unfavorable for the Middle East and North 
African states. This study also explores how identity functions within the United Nations, and 
how the structure could be improved to promote different identities and be more representative 
while solving issues of world security. Both projects mainly focus on the Middle East and North 
African states; however, each study focuses on different organs of the United Nations. 
The first study focuses on the Middle East and North African states in the General 
Assembly and Security Council. The main focuses of the study are the current system of election 
of the Middle East and North African states to the Security Council, and if the Middle East and 
North African states are unified on issue prioritization through the General Assembly Debates 
from 2009 - 2016 in order to have a consistent Middle East and North African seat on the 
Security Council. The current system and structure was found to be unfavorable to the region 
because the system of election with the rotating Arab Seat was undemocratic.  
To improve representativeness in the Security Council, the best solution would be to 
create a consistent Middle East and North African seat for the region. During this first study, 
there are several questions raised about whether the Middle East and North African states’ 
“identity” was unique, and needed comparison to other states. Also, while the General Assembly 
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and Security Council election have been often studied, I want to further look at other organs of 
the United Nations, mainly to see if the structure is unfavorable to these states. With the Security 
Council, I want to look beyond the elections and study what meeting topics states focus on 
during Security Council service.  
 The second study was designed to further expand on topics that were addressed in the 
first study. While the first study only focused on two main organs, it is necessary to further study 
other organs to see if unrepresentativeness is a pattern throughout the UN system. One of the 
major flaws of the first study was that the Middle East and North African states’ identity was 
labeled as unique, but states outside of the Middle East and North Africa were not studied to 
compare this identity. I chose the Permanent (P5) states as comparison, which have a wide array 
of international issues in which they are involved. If these states also focused consistently on the 
issues of Palestine and Syria, then the unique identity of the Middle East and North African 
states based on issue prioritization may not be unique. This was one area in which expansion of 
the previous study on the General Debate provided different results than were found before.  
I also looked at the Peacebuilding Commission, another important UN organ, as a case 
similar to the Security Council, where the membership system is unrepresentative towards the 
selected states. In addition I focused on two states, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, to see how the 
current UN structure affects individual states’ actions and identities, as opposed to a group of 
states. A major theme of the second study was structural norms within the United Nations, and 
how these unofficial structural norms may restrict identities of different regions and states, and 
also influence representation in different UN organs. 
 The two studies explore how the UN structure affects the Middle East and North African 
states through different UN organs. While the first study finds the structure of the UN to be 
5 
 
 
unfavorable to the MENA states, the second study expands on this premise, but also finds 
aspects of the UN structure that are favorable to the Middle East and North African states in 
representativeness.  
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Study 1 
 
Introduction 
According to General Assembly resolution XVIII of the UN Charter, the UN system organized 
states for Security Council election of nonpermanent seats based on the regions of Western 
Europe and Other, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe (United 
Nations Security Council 2016). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is often not 
represented in the UN system, which is problematic for Security Council elections. The region 
has the plight of being split between the African and Asian state groups in the UN system, which 
raises the question of representation and identity for the region, especially for service on the UN 
Security Council. The consistent voice of a MENA state should be welcomed, seeing as many 
major security issues currently exist in the region.  
 However, the current system of nomination is that the MENA states are nominated from 
the respective, separate groups in which they are categorized. These states are divided between 
the Africa and Asia groups, and a routine pattern of election for MENA has developed between 
the two groups since the 1990’s. According to a Special Research Report done on Security 
Council Elections, of the five consistent seats delegated to Africa and Asia, one of these seats is 
a rotating  “Arab Seat,” which switches every term between the groups (“Special Research 
Report No. 4: Security Council Elections 2011 : Special Research Report : Security Council 
Report” 2011). However, this means that MENA states can only run for election every other 
term, and the region as a whole does not decide this representation together. Many states in 
MENA have vocalized a solution to recognize this distinct identity is to create a consistent 
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MENA seat on the Security Council. My main research questions are as follows. Does MENA 
speak with one voice and is that voice distinct from Africa and Asia? Are many MENA states 
currently advocating for a designated MENA seat? Is a MENA seat necessary based on the 
current system for election? 
My expectation for this study is that the MENA region has a unified identity within the 
UN system, as seen through the high prioritization of regional-interest topics of Palestine, Syria, 
and international security, in the General Assembly Debates of 2009-2016. The strength of this 
identity will be tested through patterns before, during, and after, the Arab Spring, as well as 
before and during the Syrian Conflict. Tunisian president Mohamed Moncef Marzouki depicted 
the struggle of the Arab Spring aftermath in his 2013 General Debate speech when he said, 
“Nations require decades to gain control of their revolutions and achieve their success or failure” 
(Marzouki 2013). The Syrian Conflict was described in 2015 by Sheikh Al-Thani, Amir of 
Qatar, as having “catastrophic consequences for the Middle East region and world as a whole,” 
while in the same year Iranian President Rouhani also described the conflict as “a wave of 
destruction [that] has gone beyond the Arab world” (Al-Thani 2015) and (Rouhani 2015). 
 It is clear these conflicts impact the whole world, and will continue to do so. The addition 
of a consistent MENA seat would benefit the Security Council by routinely having an “insider 
voice” on major security issues from the region and enhance legitimacy of the body (Hurd 2008). 
Additionally, this representation could help resolutions and actions aimed at solving these 
conflicts to be more effective.  
As I am advocating for Security Council reform, it was necessary to determine what the 
process is to reform the Security Council. There is an amendment process, according to Chapter 
XVIII of the UN Charter. First, a “General Conference of the Members of the United Nations” 
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must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and nine Security 
Council members for reviewing the Charter. The proposed amendment must be adopted by two-
thirds of the General Assembly, and ratified by respective states’ processes by two-thirds of UN 
members, which must include all of the P5 members (Charter of the United Nations 1945). Due 
to the extensiveness of this process, amendments are rare and difficult to achieve. 
I expect to find that MENA states prioritize certain common regional issues, even within 
a system that does not recognize the region’s existence. MENA state representatives may 
prioritize MENA regional issues more often than the issues of their various caucuses in General 
Debate speeches. I also expect to see that the current pattern of election for MENA states is 
ineffective and unequal. I expect to find that MENA state representatives often advocate for a 
consistent seat of their own. 
To define what the “MENA region” encompasses, I draw on United Nations 
Environment Programme’s definition, comprising of the following 17 states: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen (“Partnership For Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles” 2016). This excludes other commonly grouped states such as Israel, Palestine, Sudan, 
and Turkey. Below are justifications for why certain states were included and excluded. 
 
Iran: All of the other states categorized in this region have majority ethnic Arab populations and 
are Arabic-speaking, while Iran’s population is mainly Persian and speaks Farsi. Despite this 
difference, the Iranian delegation’s website says Iran and its culture are part of the Middle East, 
which shows Iranian leaders view the state as part of the region (“General View : Permanent 
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran” 2016) and (“Iranian Press & Media : Permanent 
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Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran” 2016). Iran has not been elected to the Security Council 
since 1955, and this may be attributed to the Asian group’s lack of rotating efficiently, but more 
recently, could be because of the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran (“Special Research Report 
No. 2: Security Council Elections 2008 : Special Research Report : Security Council Report” 
2008). Potentially now with the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
deal, Iran may be more likely to be elected and confirmed to the Security Council based on good 
behavior. Charles Barber (1996) also categorized Iran in the MENA region as well. 
 
Israel: Charles Barber (1996) grouped Israel into the “Middle Eastern States” category in his 
Security Council analysis, however Israel is already categorized into the “Western Europe and 
Other Groups” in the UN system (UNITED NATIONS DGACM 2014). Even if a permanent 
MENA seat was created on the Security Council, Israel may not caucus with this group. 
Secondly, even if Israel did join the MENA caucus, the state would not likely be elected, since 
the MENA caucus (as I am proposing) would be dominated by Arab states and longtime rival 
Iran, many of whom sympathize with the Palestinian cause and condemn Israel’s actions, as is 
seen in the General Debate speeches. Lastly, although located physically in the Middle East 
region, as stated before, Israel is separate from the rest of the region in many ways, and is 
probably most suitable in WEOG.  
 
State of Palestine: Palestine’s UN Observer State status allows it to participate in the General 
Debate along with the other member states; however, Palestine is not a UN member state, so it 
cannot serve on the Security Council. If a MENA seat were created, Palestine would not be 
10 
 
 
eligible for election, and is therefore excluded from this regional grouping for the purpose of this 
study.  
 
Sudan: Although some categorize Sudan in North Africa, Sudan recently underwent a revolution 
and partition. Before splitting, Sudan may not have been considered part of MENA since it still 
included South Sudan, which was culturally and religiously separate from the North. Now, due 
to the split, Sudan may consider itself and be considered more a part of the North African states, 
as there are cultural similarities, but since this revolution occurred during the examined time-
period, Sudan’s General Debate transcripts may not reflect this identity before the revolution. 
This research is focused on the concept of MENA identity over time, so for the purposes of this 
study, Sudan has been excluded. 
 
Turkey: Turkey is also sometimes considered part of the MENA region. Turkey borders the 
Middle East and Europe: however it can often be precariously excluded from either group. In the 
UN system, Turkey is grouped into the “Western Europe and Other” for purposes of 
representation, and additionally consults with the Asia group (UNITED NATIONS DGACM 
2014).  From its pending European Union admittance, to its involvement with NATO, to its 
historical flip-flop between the Middle East and Eastern European Security Council seats, as 
identified by Charles Barber, Turkey does not quite fit into one region, and due to this limbo, 
Turkey will not be included in this study (1996). 
 
 Although this definition of the MENA region may seem like it is a grouping of common 
cultural and religious states that is common in the United Nations, the name “Middle East and 
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North Africa” indicates a geographical place in the world. I am not proposing this be an “Arab” 
or “Islamic” seat, because then that becomes less geographical and more political of a grouping. 
Another note is that the “Western Europe and Other Group,” is not really a regionally defined 
group, as it spreads from Australia to North America to Western Europe to Turkey to Israel, and 
seems to be a group defined by common values. So a MENA caucus grouped regionally and also 
culturally would not be commonplace in the UN system. 
12 
 
 
Literature Review  
The major work that framed this project was Zweifel’s study, “International Organizations and 
Democracy,” which has the main premise that international organizations are not, and do not 
strive to be democratic. Legitimate proposals for reform of international organizations need to be 
specifically targeted, as opposed to general, when addressing undemocratic aspects of these 
organizations. His main indicator that the United Nations is not focused on democracy is that the 
UN Charter never once says “We the People,” or “democracy,” showing the organization is not 
focused on representing the people democratically, but more about representing the interests of 
state governments. From studying different international organizations, Zweifel concluded that 
bodies like the United Nations need to incorporate stakeholders more and increase democratic 
elements, one such way by increasing the permanent and nonpermanent members of the Security 
Council. In my project, I use this premise of increased regional representation in UN organs to 
increase democratic elements in the organization and establish legitimacy of the organs. Since 
UN organs propose policy and programming, it is essential that these organs establish legitimacy 
in order to be effective in actuality.  
 Another source that discusses a precedent of diversity in democracy is Federalist Paper 
10 by James Madison. The essay discusses that the formation of factions is unavoidable and also 
necessary to preserve democracy. Madison argues that the more parties there are functioning in a 
democracy, the less likely it is for one to oppress the others, and similarly, less likely for one 
faction’s interests to be represented over another’s. Additionally, expansion of representation to 
many different groups also means that more ideas are represented, making the organization more 
democratic. These ideas were instrumental in the foundation of American democracy, and based 
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on ideas of theorists of the time. While the previous articles were favorable of diverse 
representation, the following article is critical of great factionalism.  
 Scholarly literature on general UN Security Council reform discusses the difficulty of the 
UN reform and the domination of P5 states in this process. David Caron is a scholar who is 
skeptical of expansion of representation as a means of improving democracy, because he 
believes the cost is efficiency. Under the premise that increased representation will decrease 
efficiency, Caron questions what the balance and relationship of legitimacy and efficiency is for 
the Security Council. For example, how many states would be perceived as “legitimate enough” 
on the Security Council, while also maintaining a certain level of “efficiency.” According to 
Caron, this is an inverse relationship: increased representation leads to decreased efficiency. 
Caron also discusses the domination of the powerful states as a reason for Security Council 
reform, but questions if increasing the number of members would counteract this problem. His 
solution to this problem is to increase Security Council membership slowly, but still says even 
then more power could be transferred to the already powerful states and may not be the solution 
to the problem. Caron reflects an opposing view to Security Council reform by way of increasing 
membership to be more diverse and representative. 
 Slaughter discusses Security Council expansion hopes for the G4 states, Brazil, India, 
Japan, and Germany, to become permanent members on the Security Council, but due to UN 
politics and the influence of the P5, most likely will not (2006). Ian Hurd (2008), who discusses 
the view that the Security Council’s legitimacy depends on its diverse representation of the 
world. With this view, the more different the members on the Security Council, the more 
legitimate the body is. Hurd advocates for more seats to be added to the Security Council to 
ensure diversity, because a single state cannot fully represent all of the different ideas of the 
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greater region (Hurd, 2008, 200). Both scholars depicted the difficulty of changing the Security 
Council election procedure. The authors assume that the current structure of the Security Council 
is ineffective and unrepresentative, and Security Council expansion would solve this problem. 
However, large states could still dominate the Security Council, and maybe the reform would not 
be representative enough. These articles emphasized that reform is important, but unlikely. 
Another gap is that neither talked about having a consistent seat on the Security Council for a 
region, which is what this project advocates for as a way of increasing representativeness. 
 There is also a gap in literature written on the topic of a MENA Security Council seat, or 
MENA representation in the United Nations. This seems surprising, as the region is commonly 
recognized as a separate entity, and contains major international security issues. The only 
mention of MENA representation was found in a policy brief for the Center on International 
Cooperation, which mentioned the Arab Group’s vocalization for a permanent Arab seat on the 
Security Council (Gowan and Gordon 2014, 29). Gowan and Gordon also discussed the role of 
the Arab League in the UN system, which speaks out about important MENA issues such as 
Syria (Gowan and Gordon 2014, 16). This article was important in finding out that the absence 
of a MENA seat has been noted by other scholars, but also in discussing the advocacy role of 
international organizations. The article discussed a topic not well covered by scholars and filled a 
gap, but the scholar discussed many different topics on the surface-level, as opposed to focusing 
on one in depth. There was little discussion of the factors and details surrounding each of the 
topics in the brief.  
In summary, general discussions on Security Council reform were found more frequently 
than discussion of adding a consistent MENA seat to the Security Council. It seems few scholars 
are discussing or advocating for consistent MENA membership on the Security Council. 
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However, the question is if MENA states representatives themselves call for a seat, which will be 
looked at through analysis of General Debate transcripts. This is helpful in seeing the challenges 
to reform, as well as the prominent voices advocating for Security Council reform. My research 
will expand on what a MENA seat would look like: who represents MENA now, what issues are 
important to the region, and why a consistent MENA seat is essential, which has not been 
covered by previous scholars.   
 As the issues of the Palestinian and Syria conflicts will be discussed within the General 
Debate in this project, it is important to look at what has previously been written on the topic. 
Both scholarly articles focused on the Palestinian Conflict detailed the history of UN actions and 
discourse surrounding the conflict. The pattern was that the more powerful states are involved in 
the Conflict, but this has not led to any results. There was also a pattern of limitation for what the 
United Nations can do to solve the Conflict. The articles detailed exact UN actions and 
resolutions that happened to emphasize the point, but did not discuss if MENA states influenced 
or affected actions, only how the P5 were involved.  
 All of this is important because the unsolved nature of this Conflict partly explains why 
there is a pattern of this topic being brought up by MENA states in the General Assembly. With 
articles discussing the UN and the Syria Conflict, a similar pattern of UN action, followed by 
little results, or UN inaction, was found. These articles did bring up a different analysis of the 
situation from the Palestinian Conflict. The authors mentioned that if the United Nations 
continues to be ineffective in upholding international law with the Syrian Conflict, it would 
seriously undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations (Rostow, Koh, Mathias, Mohamed, 
and Arsanjani 2012). These analyses by other scholars lend some legitimacy to my claim that the 
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reasons these conflicts are brought up most frequently is due to the current system’s 
ineffectiveness in solving these regional issues.  
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Methodology 
This qualitative case study analyzes archival data (Berg and Lune 2017, 165). The archival data 
are drawn from primary sources from the UN website, including the UN General Debate 
Speeches Archives, UN Security Council member records, and the UN Peacekeeping website. 
To learn about the current system of election to the Security Council for MENA states, 
and to follow the pattern of the rotating MENA seat, I updated Charles Barber’s work, “UNSC 
Representation: The First 50 Years and Beyond” (1996). I used the UN Security Council website 
to record the amount of times MENA states served on the Security Council, when the states 
gained independence and UN membership, and if there were any patterns in service since the 
inception of the United Nations in 1945. If the states had not served on the Security Council for a 
long time, I calculated how long it had been since they served to see if there was a present 
pattern. Collecting these qualitative data were essential to seeing the representation patterns of 
election to Security Council. 
To complement the data updating Barber’s work, I examined peacekeeping troop and 
police contributions by each selected state, to see if there is a correlation between the number of 
terms served on Security Council and the number of peacekeeping troop contributions. This is 
because peacekeeping contributions are often an indicator of states “maintaining international 
peace and security,” and by demonstrating this commitment, it may help states get elected to the 
Security Council (UN Security Council 2016). Since I was comparing data over time, I looked at 
data starting from 2000, to 2016, because before 2000 the data were measured differently, and I 
wanted to keep the data measurements consistent for comparison. The contribution timeframe 
every year was from January-August, because the 2016 data only goes until August, and again, I 
wanted to keep my measurements consistent. I then took the average of all of the contributions of 
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one state over the time period to compare the figures. For the second graph of the peacekeeping 
data, the data were expanded to include the years 1990-2000, because this is the earliest data 
shown for peacekeeping on the website. As the goal of these data are to show a comparison over 
time with each state, not to each other, the measurement methods being different does not skew 
the data like the above.  
To determine if MENA states represent similar interests in the UN system, I conducted 
content analysis on the General Debate transcripts of MENA states from 2009-2016.  This 
timeframe was chosen because the MENA region has faced tumultuous and divisive unrest with 
the Arab Spring and the Syrian Conflict. It was necessary to look before, during, and after these 
events to see if the MENA region generally has remained unified on security and peace priorities 
throughout this period of unrest. This longstanding pattern could speak to the unity and identity 
of the region as a whole, and if a seat would work for the region.   
Each MENA state’s General Debate speeches were searched for key phrases and patterns 
of issues. These issues were looked at across the states and the timeframe. I counted the number 
of MENA state representatives who brought up certain topics each year, looked at the number of 
times certain issues were brought up for each state’s speech, and calculated percentages based on 
these findings.  
  As defined by the UN website, the General Debate is “…the annual meeting of Heads of 
State and Government at the beginning of the General Assembly session…the only one in which 
Heads of State and Government regularly participate” (Frequently Asked Questions about the 
United Nations Security Council 2016). The General Debate serves as a platform for states to 
discuss their priorities to the world. If a speaker in the General Debate used one of the terms in 
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the codebook below, this counted as a “mention.” State representatives have limited time and if 
they spend time to discuss a topic, even briefly, this shows a commitment to this issue.  
 The main topics of analyses of “international security,” “Palestine,” and “Syria” were 
chosen because these are current topics that would most likely be brought up on the Security 
Council that pertain to the MENA region. International security is a more broad term, designed 
to show state’s general commitment to ideas of security and counter-terrorism. This topic was 
chosen before I started the research process. I chose the conflicts of Palestine and Syria because 
these are two of the largest security issues in the MENA region that currently render discussion 
in the Security Council. I also selected Security Council reform to determine if MENA states 
advocate for reform and demand a continuous seat on the Security Council.  
To see if the MENA states potentially identify with their respective caucuses, I decided to 
also track general and unspecific African and Asian topics in addition to the two MENA topics. 
This paper assumes specific topics in the MENA region are more important for region members 
than to other regions. I found the General Debate data show no pattern of specific African or 
Asian issues the MENA states discussed over time, whereas there was a pattern of the MENA 
topics of Palestine and Syria being consistently brought up by a majority of states every year. If 
MENA states brought up topics related to their caucuses more consistently than MENA issues, 
this could show a MENA Security Council seat would not be necessary because the states 
identify with the African and Asian regions. This comparison could also further show that a 
MENA seat is necessary if MENA topics are more of a focus to these states.  
 Shown below Table 1 with coded indicator topics related to the UN Security Council and 
MENA region, with explanation of the methodology for content analysis.  
 
 
20 
 
 
Table 1: Coding for UN General Debate Phrases 
Topic Phrases 
Palestine • Question of Palestine 
• State of Palestine 
• Israeli aggression/ violation 
• Arab-Israeli Conflict  
• Arab Peace Process 
• Palestinian brothers 
• Two-state solution 
Syria  • Syrian Conflict  
• Syrian regime 
• Syrian people 
• Syrian brothers 
• Syrian refugees 
International 
Security 
• Terrorism 
• Counterterrorism 
• Nonproliferation  
• Chemical and Nuclear weapons 
• Terrorist organizations  
• International Security 
UN Reform • Security Council Reform 
• Africa seat 
• MENA seat 
• Arab seat 
• General UN reform 
Africa • An issue in an African state outside of described MENA region (all 
states on the African continent below the Sahara) 
• Africa as a whole 
• African identity 
• African Union  
Asia1 • An issue in an Asian country outside of described MENA region (East 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia) 
• Asia as a whole 
                                                 
1 Comment: Originally only Security Council reform was going to be looked at as a topic, however, there 
was equal if not more calls for general UN reform by MENA region states. I made the determination that 
these generally give the same idea and would be appropriate to consolidate. 
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I marked that a topic had been mentioned after the first occurrence of it in the General 
Debate transcripts for each state. For the specific MENA issues of Palestine and Syria, I 
calculated the number of times mentioned within each speech to see if there was a pattern of how 
often individual states brought up these issues, and if this contributes to the idea of “MENA 
identity.” I thought by calculating these specific issues, it could expand my argument that this 
identity is present. These issues affect the whole region, and a region-wide prioritization of these 
issues on the world stage may indicate a regional identity encompassing similar beliefs, political 
goals, and culture. For this calculation, I counted every time a state representative mentioned one 
of the key phrases in Table 1. For the other issues, the number of times mentioned in the 
individual transcripts was not calculated; because the mere fact the issues were brought up in this 
forum shows their significance.  
The topics above had to be explicitly stated in order to count for this study, however, 
there was one instance where King Abdullah of Jordan alluded to the topic of Palestine. In his 
2015 speech, he said that Jordan “join[s] Muslims and Christians everywhere in rejecting threats 
to the holy places and the Arab character of that Holy City” (Abdullah 2015). This phrase does 
not specifically state support for Palestine with this vague wording. I included the topic as a 
“mention” because Jordan would not allude to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the General Debate if 
they did not find it important. This interpretation is subjective, and others could interpret this 
differently.  
 Attitudes towards these topics were not analyzed as “positive,” “negative,” and “neutral,” 
for a few reasons. Due to the history and cultural identity of the MENA region, their attitudes 
towards the issue of Palestine are generally the same. The Palestinians share this cultural identity 
with Arab and Islamic states, and therefore these states are sympathetic to the Palestinian side of 
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the conflict, and this can be seen through the language used in the previous coding table. The 
General Debate speeches indicated all of the MENA states selected did have this view. The 
Syrian Conflict has more varied attitudes, but the importance of the issue is similar even if the 
points of view are not exactly the same. For the other issues, it did not seem conducive to this 
analysis to describe an issue such as international security or UN reform as “positive” or 
“negative.” For this project, further categorization of the selected topics was deemed 
unnecessary. 
In general, the reader should allow for a slight margin of error, as human error in 
calculating and counting easily occurs. The methodology and process for collecting the data has 
been depicted in careful detail. If the study is to be replicated, start by using the UN Security 
Council website to see the list of which states have served on the Security Council, and when 
they served. The list of UN membership dates can also be found on the UN website under 
“About the UN,” and then “Member States.” The UN “Member States” section included most of 
the dates of independence.  
For the General Debate speech process, I accessed the UN General Debate transcripts 
through the UN archives. I looked at English transcripts of Sessions 64-71 for the 16 states (17 in 
2012 and 2015 when a Saudi Arabian representative participated) in the MENA region. I visited 
each state’s General Debate speeches page in the selected years and read the transcripts for 
mention of these topics, noted if a topic was mentioned in a table, and counted the times the key 
phrases for Palestine and Syria were mentioned. After all of the data were collected, I calculated 
the percent of states that brought up a certain topic each year by dividing the states that 
mentioned the topic over the total number of states who participated that year. I looked for 
patterns during this timeframe.  
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For the peacekeeping data, I used the UN website to find the troop and police 
contributions each year, and then averaged all of the contributions for each MENA state during 
the 2000-2016 timeframe. I reported how many were contributed for every selected state, and 
compared side-by-side with the number of Security Council terms to look for a correlation.  
I collected data from secondary sources such as the UN Press and UN News Services 
websites, and scholarly articles about UN reform. Quotations from press statements were 
necessary to show that the MENA topics of Palestine and Syria were deemed important by 
others, and to the United Nations as well. These data show security issues that were important to 
MENA were also important to the United Nations, and MENA may provide insight and problem 
solving to these issues with a reserved seat on the Security Council. If these issues were not 
deemed important by UN representatives and administration, it would not matter as much if 
MENA prioritized them because it may not be as necessary for them to have a separate 
permanent seat. The literature on the Security Council reform was enlightening as to a) how hard 
reforming the United Nations, especially the Security Council, is, and b) that MENA has been 
neglected in reform discussion. Though maybe important to the region, other states are more 
widely recognized as needing UNSC reform. This evaluated the feasibility of a MENA seat 
being created, and it was found there is lack of discourse on the issue among scholars and 
MENA states alike.  
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Security Council Representation 
I updated Charles Barber’s “ UNSC Representation: The First 50 Years and Beyond,” focusing 
only on the previously-defined 17 MENA states to introduce the current dynamics of election to 
the Security Council as a member of the MENA region, and the need for a permanent MENA 
seat. Charles Barber used quantitative analysis to explain patterns in Security Council service by 
regional caucuses, as well as the broader political context to explain these trends. In 2015, 
Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lamamra, said in his General Debate speech that 
Security Council reform is necessary as the Security Council “no longer mirrors the composition 
of the international community, particularly the African continent,” which brings up 
dissatisfaction with the current system for the African group (Lamamra, 2015). More 
specifically, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Al Sabah said in the 2012 General Debate that 
Security Council membership should be added to “….reflect the new international reality and to 
ensure that Arab and Islamic States are represented fairly,” and once again brought up the need 
for a region-specific seat because “issues relating to the Arab States and their region top the 
agenda of the Council…” (Al Sabah, 2012) and (Al Sabah, 2015).   
 Barber (1996) defined the Middle East region as 23 states, however; only 17 states will 
be categorized in the MENA region in this study. Barber included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Turkey, in this region; however, the UN system Economic Commission for Europe 
categorized theses states in Europe, so are not included in this study (“Member States and 
Member States Representatives” 2016). Barber also included Israel in the Middle East, however; 
the UN designates Israel in the Western Europe and Other group and is not included in this 
study. The inclusion of these four states plus the 17 previously mentioned brings Barber’s total to 
22. I could not determine the last state, potentially two states (if he did not count Turkey in his 
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Middle East state total) Barber included in the Middle East, however, these states were never 
specifically discussed throughout the article and could not be accurately predicted.  
Barber’s study was conducted to 1996, and focused on regional groups, whereas I 
expanded to 2017 with the specified MENA states. I found a consistent pattern of a MENA seat 
alternating between the African and Asian groups. Table 2 shows the number of times each of 
the 17 states served on the Security Council, when these terms were, the date of independence 
for the state, and the date of UN membership. 
 
Table 2: MENA States Served on Security Council, 1946 to 2017 
MENA 
States 
Number 
of Terms 
on 
Security 
Council 
Terms Date of 
Independence  
Date of UN 
Membership  
UN 
Caucus 
Egypt 5 1946, 1949-
1950, 1984-
1985, 
 1996-1997, 
2016-2017 
23/07/1952 24/10/1945 Africa 
Syria 3 1947-1948, 
1970-1971, 
2002-2003 
17/04/1946  24/10/1945 Asia 
Lebanon 2 1953-1954, 
2010-2011 
22/11/1943  24/10/1945 Asia 
Iran 1 1955-1956 01/04/1979 24/10/1945 Asia 
Iraq 2 1957-1958, 
1974-1975 
14/07/1958 21/12/1945 Asia 
Tunisia 3 1959-1960, 
1980-1981, 
2000-2001 
 20/03/1956 12/11/1956 Africa 
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Morocco 3 1963-
1964,1992-
1993, 2012-
2013 
 18/11/1955 12/11/1956 Africa 
Jordan 3 1965-1966, 
1982-1983, 
2014-2015 
25/05/1946  14/12/1955 Asia 
Algeria 3 1968-1969, 
1988-
1989, 2004-
2005 
01/11/1954  08/10/1962 Africa  
Libya 2 1976-1977, 
2008-2009 
24/12/1951  14/12/1955 Africa 
Kuwait 1 1978-1979 25/02/1950 14/05/1963 Asia 
UAE 1 1986-1987 02/12/1971 09/12/1971 Asia 
Yemen 1 1990-1991 22/05/1990 30/09/1947 Asia 
Oman 1 1994-1995 18/11/1940 07/10/1971 Asia 
Bahrain 1 1998-1999 16/12/1971 21/09/1971 Asia 
Qatar 1 2006-2007 03/09/1971  21/09/1971 Asia 
Saudi 
Arabia2 
0 Elected, but 
rejected seat 
23/09/1932 24/10/1945 Asia 
Sources: “List of Countries Which Have Been Elected Members of the United Nations Security 
Council since 1946” and “List of National Independence Days.”  
 
 
 It is important to discuss the necessity of the date of independence and UN membership. 
In this region, all states were colonies, and most did not become UN member states until 
                                                 
2 Saudi Arabia was elected to the Security Council in 2014, however, ended up denying the seat. 
Expanded on in Study II. 
 
27 
 
 
independence, which affects the number of times these states have served on the Security 
Council. There are a few key patterns that can be seen from this table. One of which is that the 
North African states, minus Egypt, received independence later than several Middle Eastern 
states, and waited an equal, if not shorter amount of time to serve on the Security Council from 
the year they were granted UN membership. The pattern of the alternating MENA Security 
Council seat between the African and Asian states is evident from the table.  
 This rotation, however, does not lead to equality in representation, due to the difference 
in sizes between the split MENA groups. There are only five North African states who serve on 
the rotating seat when it comes to the African caucus, as opposed to 12 Middle Eastern states in 
the Asian caucus, which means Middle East states have a voice on the Security Council less than 
the North African states. From the data collected, it is inferred the rotating pattern between 
African and Middle Eastern states will continue, which means the North African states will serve 
almost twice as many times as the Middle Eastern states. This uneven division does not allow for 
equal voices from MENA to be heard. The argument could be made that MENA is actually 
better off being divided, because the pool is smaller for competition when each group gets the 
MENA seat.  
 However, each group must wait until they get the MENA seat in order to run, whereas 
with a consistent MENA seat, interested MENA states could run whenever they wanted. With 
ever changing issues in the Middle East, like Palestine and the Syrian conflict, the timing of 
serving on the Security Council could align with major decisions being made about the issue. 
With a MENA seat, all of the states would have a fairer chance of being nominated within a 
group of similar states, as opposed to being grouped with a larger continent.  
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 Barber noted that Africa has one of the best records for representation, whereas the Asian 
group is highly dominated by leaders of the region (Barber 1996). Recently, this has allowed the 
North African states to each serve on the Security Council about every 20 years; as there is five 
states that equally rotate every four terms. For example, Egypt served in 1996-1997, and again in 
2016-2017, because this seat rotated through each North African state until it was Egypt’s turn 
again. However, on the Middle East side, there is a pattern of states serving on the Security 
Council less, but many also did not join the United Nations until 1971 (UAE, Oman, Bahrain, 
Qatar), which is later than the North African states who joined in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 
1960s. It is possible, however, that these previously mentioned states did not want to serve on the 
Security Council, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 There are also gaps in MENA states serving on the Security Council before 1996, which 
indicate this is not always a true and reserved MENA rotating seat. From 1951-1952, Turkey 
served on the Security Council and from 1972-1973, Sudan served on the Security Council, 
when none of the defined MENA states did at this time (List of Countries Which Have Been 
Elected… 2016). So although it cannot be proven they replaced the rotating seat, it could be 
assumed by looking at the other states that also served at the same time. I have already discussed 
why these states are problematic in representing MENA, so during these years, MENA’s 
interests may not have been represented much. Although this gap hasn’t occurred for several 
decades, it still shows that the seat could easily be delegated to another state because it is 
“unofficial.”  
 The Security Council has four main goals: “to maintain international peace and security, 
to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and 
in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,” 
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and the peacekeeping program is the most aligned with achieving these goals (United Nations 
Security Council 2016). The clearest way for states to demonstrate this commitment to Security 
Council service and international peace and security is by providing peacekeeping troops to 
missions. I looked at peacekeeping troop contributions by state for the following reasons: one, to 
see if there is a correlation in the number of terms served on the Security Council and the number 
of peacekeeping troops supplied, and two, if when a state served on the Security Council or was 
about to, the state changed peacekeeping contribution numbers. The number of peacekeeping 
troops contributed or lack there of could indicate a state’s desire to be on the Security Council.  
Table 3: MENA States’ Average Number of Peacekeeping Troops and Police 
Contributions, 2000-2016 
MENA State 
Average 
Peacekeeping Troops 
and Police 
Contributed 
Number of Terms 
Served on Security 
Council 
Jordan 2801 3 
Egypt  1893 5 
Morocco 1396 3 
Tunisia 254 3 
Yemen 192 1 
UAE 93 1 
Qatar 24 1 
Algeria 12 3 
Libya 4 2 
Iran 3 1 
Lebanon 1 2 
Bahrain 0 1 
Iraq 0 2 
Kuwait 0 1 
Oman 0 1 
Syria 0 3 
Saudi Arabia3 0   0* 
  Source: “Troop and Police Contributors. United Nations Peacekeeping.”  
                                                 
3  Saudi Arabia was elected to the Security Council in 2014, however, ended up denying the seat. 
Expanded on in Study II. 
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 From the table above, there appears to be some correlation in that the top four 
contributors to peacekeeping operations in the MENA region (Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia) are also among those who have served the most terms on the Security Council for the 
region. This may show a connection of demonstrating commitment to international peace and 
wanting to be elected to the Security Council, to actually being elected to the Security Council. 
There are two important outliers to this pattern: Algeria and Syria, both of whom have served as 
many times as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, but with an average contribution of 12 and 0 troops 
and police, respectively. Algeria serving three times on the Security Council goes back to the 
unfairness of the rotating MENA seat. The cyclical pattern that has been established means that 
Algeria will be elected regardless, without needing to contribute a significant amount of 
peacekeepers. The North African states seem to nominate each other for Security Council based 
on fairness, not based on peacekeeping contributions. 
 Since increased peacekeeping contributions can show a commitment and desire to be on 
the Security Council, it is possible based on the lack of contribution from the Middle East states 
there is a lack of desire to be on the Security Council. A major flaw in Barber’s work is that he 
assumes every state wants to serve on the Security Council, which may not be true. Based on his 
findings, he assumes that since the Asian caucus is dominated by a few powerful states, many 
states are not elected to the Security Council. In reality, states may not bid for Security Council 
service because they do not wish to serve on the Security Council, not because they go unelected 
by fellow states. The states who provided 0 peacekeepers during the examined time period, 
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are all in the Asian caucus, and have also 
served on the Security Council a low number of terms. The one exception is Syria, who has 
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served three times, equal to big-time contributors Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. It makes sense 
that Syria has served a high amount of times without necessarily having a high amount of 
peacekeepers because Syria was the second state in the MENA region to become a member of 
the United Nations in 1945, so Syria has had a long amount of time to serve. If Security Council 
election can be based on the “merit” of providing a lot of peacekeeping troops, it seems unfair 
that based on the rotation, these numbers may not matter at all.  
 Although it cannot be directly proven that states that serve on the Security Council more 
often also contribute the most peacekeepers, it seems to be a pattern that commitment to 
peacekeeping can also mean commitment to Security Council service. To avoid the same 
assumption Barber made, I looked at states around the time of Security Council to see if these 
states altered their peacekeeping contributions in order to demonstrate “maintaining international 
peace and security” (United Nations Security Council 2016). 
Figure 1: Peacekeeping Contributions for Selected MENA States, One Year before Security 
Council Term to Second Year of Security Council Term, 1991-20174 
 
 Source: “Troop and Police Contributors Archive (2000 - 2010). United Nations 
 Peacekeeping.”  
                                                 
4 Egypt only has two data points because those are figures from its current term on  the Security 
Council, and the second year has not happened yet. 
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 From the period of 1990-2016, an increase in peacekeeping troops in the years before and 
during the term on the Security Council could be seen with five different states. The states of 
Morocco and Egypt heavily increased numbers in the year leading up to Security Council 
service, which was most likely when elections were happening, whereas Tunisia and Qatar 
highly increased numbers during time on the Security Council. As discussed before, due to the 
noncompetitive North African pattern for the Security Council seat, it does not seem necessary 
that states increase peacekeeping troops to demonstrate qualification to serve, however it is 
possible Egypt and Morocco did so to promote an image of commitment to peace and security, 
or perhaps there were peacekeeping missions that fit their interests.  
 The UN Security Council and peacekeeping data showed the unfairness of the current 
system of election for the MENA states. This questions, however, if the MENA states are unified 
in interests and thoughts in the UN system to have a consistent MENA representative on the 
Security Council. 
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General Debate 
In this section, I will discuss the results from the General Debates. While I am expecting MENA 
states to be unified on regional issues, it is necessary to see if the states align on issues focused 
on the Security Council’s mission. As discussed before, the UN Security Council focuses on “the 
maintenance of international peace and security,” as well as settling disputes around the world 
peacefully (“United Nations Security Council” 2016). Members on the Security Council are 
expected to participate in discourse and decision-making to promote this mission, as well as 
determine topics of discussion. States from different regions often serve as the voice of their 
region and bring up the issues and viewpoints of this region. I tracked certain issues, which can 
be found in the following sections. 
 
Palestine  
The topic of Palestine was brought up by the most states of all of the topics tracked. Every year, 
Palestine was brought up by 80% or more of the MENA states, as can be seen in Table 4. 
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Table 5: MENA States’ Discussion of Palestinian Conflict in General Debate, 2009-2015 
Year Number of States Mentioned 
Support for Palestine 
Total MENA 
States 
Percent of States Mentioned 
Palestine 
2009 14 16 88% 
2010 16 16 100% 
2011 13 16 81% 
2012 17 175 100% 
2013 14 16 88% 
2014 15 16 94% 
2015 15 17 88% 
2016 15 17 88% 
Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 – 2016.  
 
 
These findings show that MENA is unified on the priority of the Palestinian issue. The 
nature of these mentions, as discussed in the “Coding” in the Methodology section, are in 
support of a solution to the Palestinian situation, or are critical of Israeli actions toward Palestine, 
which shows MENA is mostly unified in ideology towards the issue as well. Most of the MENA 
states view the Palestinian Conflict from a social justice perspective—these states want 
recognition and statehood for their fellow region member. Since the Palestinian conflict is an 
issue of peace and security, which is what the Security Council focuses on, I can infer that, any 
MENA state serving on the Security Council would represent the region’s interests and priority 
on the Palestinian issue.  
                                                 
5 Number of MENA states was 17 when Saudi Arabia participated in the General Debates. Expanded on 
in Study II. 
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Throughout the six years, every MENA state supported the Palestinian cause in the 
General Debate, but sometimes there were fluctuations when a few states did not bring the topic 
up in certain years. For instance, it is unclear why in General Debate speeches from 2013-2015, 
the representative of Morocco did not bring up the Palestinian Conflict once, especially since it 
was mentioned in all of the prior years. Despite this one fluctuation, the Palestinian conflict is 
overwhelmingly a unifying, regional issue. MENA representation on the Security Council is 
essential for the Palestinian Conflict because of regional interest, and is a conflict that Secretary 
Ban Ki-moon described as having “long-pending issues,” which will most likely continue to be 
discussed on the Security Council as it is unresolved (United Nations News Service 2016).  
 
Syrian Conflict 
The Syrian Conflict was brought up by the second-most among MENA states from 2012 (when 
the conflict escalated) to 2016. Secretary Ban Ki-Moon unofficially described the Syrian 
Conflict as “a clear threat to international peace and security,” at a Security Council meeting 
(United Nations Press 2015). The table below shows the number of MENA states that discussed 
the Syrian Conflict in General Debate speeches. 
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Table 6: MENA States’ Discussion of Syrian Conflict in General Debate, 2012-2016 
Year Number of States Mentioned 
Syrian Conflict 
Total MENA 
States 
Percent of States Mentioned 
Syrian Conflict 
2012 15 176 88% 
2013 15 16 94% 
2014 13 16 81% 
2015 13 17 76% 
2016 14 17 82% 
Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 – 2016. 
 
 
 The findings show that every year since the Syrian Conflict began, 75% or more of 
MENA states have discussed the Syrian Conflict in the General Debate. While many of the states 
studied condemn the conflict in Syria and are unsupportive of the regime, it cannot be ignored 
that the transcripts of Syria and Iran were read for this project. The Syrian and Iranian 
representatives had a pro-Syrian regime perspective of the conflict, however despite this 
difference, I am arguing that these states still prioritize the Conflict and recognize its importance. 
Since the conflict has major security implications for the world, this issue will likely be 
discussed in the Security Council. As with the Palestinian Conflict, most MENA states each year 
mentioned the importance of solving the Conflict for the region, so this issue also shows that the 
studied MENA states have unified security priorities.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Number of states was 17 when a representative of Saudi Arabia participated in the General Debates. 
Expanded on in Study II. 
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International Security  
Another issue clearly related to the Security Council is international security, which consists of 
general topics related to terrorism, nuclear/chemical weapons, and non-proliferation. MENA 
states discussed this topic the most after the topics of Palestine and Syria. Each year between 
2009-2016, at least 50% or more, sometimes up to 100%, of MENA states brought up issues of 
international security. By discussing these topics, the selected MENA states showed a 
commitment to serve on the Security Council. 
 
UN Reform 
While these results were not found to be as significant as the previous findings, on average, 30% 
or more of MENA states mentioned a need for general UN or Security Council reform each year, 
with the highest being 44% of MENA states in 2010 (Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 - 
2015). Even though there were not an overwhelming number of MENA states brought up reform 
in the selected timeframe, the idea is still present. I expected there to be a stronger pattern of the 
chosen states mentioning UN reform than was found. However, this also does not necessarily 
represent which states do/do not support UN reform or a MENA seat because there may be states 
that would support a MENA seat if it became likely. As discussed before, it seems that Brazil, 
India, Germany, or Japan seat is discussed before a MENA seat, and the reform process is 
difficult, so perhaps some states wanted to focus on other important issues in the General Debate 
instead of Security Council reform that may be unfeasible. 
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African / Asian Topics 
The last topics I analyzed in the General Debate transcripts is the number of states that 
mentioned issues about Africa and Asia to see if the MENA states mentioned these more than the 
MENA issues. For these data, the MENA states were split to see if issues from Africa and Asia 
were prioritized.  For most years, 80% or more of the five-member MENA North African group 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) mentioned African topics outside of the MENA 
region defined earlier. It was quite surprising to find how consistently the North African group 
brought up these other issues, almost as equally in number as the MENA issues.  
 For the Asian group, there were different findings. The Asian group is defined as the 12 
states of Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Syria, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
and Yemen. However, the Middle East group in Asia inconsistently brought up topics about the 
other states of Asia, ranging from 50% of MENA states in 2012 to 8% of states in 2015. It 
should be noted that in 2012, there was a disastrous flood in Pakistan, which is the Asian topic 
that was brought up by many states that year, but this was an uncommon occurrence. It seems the 
African states may feel a stronger affinity to Africa than the Asian group states feel to Asia; 
however, this does not truly prove that either is attached to the larger groups. It may just be an 
indicator that during the General Debate, the MENA states are more likely to bring up MENA 
topics as opposed to African/Asian topics. Even though this may show the North African group 
prioritize African issues almost equally to MENA issues, it does not necessarily mean these 
states would not support the addition of a MENA reserved seat in the UN Security Council. 
The results from the General Debate suggest that there is a regional identity for the 
MENA states studied within the UN system that persists over time because most states 
prioritized the same MENA security issues. During this time, MENA underwent the Arab 
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Spring, continuing Palestinian Conflict, ISIL, and the Syrian Conflict. Despite this, throughout 
this time period, there were regional patterns of identity. The findings from the UN General 
Debates from 2009-2016 show that the MENA states consistently focus on issues relevant to the 
MENA region, and inconsistently focus on the issues of their respective regional caucuses. The 
research also shows that UN reform is not brought up consistently and overwhelmingly, but 
usually brought up by a third of states each year. If given a reserved Security Council seat, the 
MENA states would most likely have a unified voice about issues and interests the states would 
represent, but the region is not vocally advocating for this seat, as seen in the General Debate.  
40 
 
 
Conclusions of Study 1 
The United Nations and the Security Council should recognize the MENA identity, especially 
since many current international security issues originate in the MENA region, and this voice 
should be viewed as essential. The results have shown the inefficiency and unfairness of election 
to the Security Council for the MENA states, while simultaneously proving the general 
unification of the MENA states enough to be recognized as a separate region, perhaps more than 
their currently categorized groups. While the reform of the United Nations is complex and 
difficult to achieve, I argue that a consistent MENA seat on the Security Council is imperative to 
international security and peace.  
 A way to expand this research could be to look at the sequence order, but I think 
mentioning an issue is an indicator enough of its importance to the state representative speaking. 
An area for further study would be to look at General Debate transcripts further back in time, to 
see if this identity has been as cohesive as it was during this timeframe. Another source to use in 
addition to UN General Debate transcripts would be the different MENA states’ UN delegation 
websites, to see which issues are discussed there as well. If looking at other regional identity 
issues, it could be interesting to look at the split between Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
the different regions of Africa and Asia to see if they align on issue priorities as well. It is 
possible that large geographical groupings of states may not be the most effective way for 
interests to be represented on the Security Council. This study found this structure to be 
unfavorable to MENA states, and it is possible aspects of the UN could be restructured to benefit 
other groups as well. 
 With a recognized MENA seat on the Security Council, representation could be improved 
and more diversified, and there could be more democratic elections to the Security Council than 
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the current system. The current Security Council does not promote diverse representation to 
reflect the world now. MENA is a commonly accepted region now, and the persisting colonial 
structure of the organ prevents these states from being able to elect each other in the most 
democratic way possible. This goes back to the idea of if the United Nations was made to be 
democratic, or as effective as possible at the cost of representativeness.  
 While some scholars worry that if the Security Council is enlarged, the effectiveness of 
the organ will be compromised, however, the Security Council is already ineffective towards the 
conflicts in the MENA region, which can be seen by their unresolved status. I do not see how 
adding more seats on the Security Council could make the organ less effective towards these 
conflicts than they already are. In addition, perhaps increasing representation would not only 
bolster legitimacy of Security Council resolutions, but also make the organ more effective by 
having a wider spread of ideas from different regions. Maybe certain long-persisting problems in 
the Middle East are unsolved due to the MENA region being grouped into broader geographical 
areas, and therefore having to represent a plethora of interests. Certain aspects of the organs of 
the Security Council and General Assembly were found to be unrepresentative and in long need 
of reform for the selected MENA states, and it can only be imagined what could be 
accomplished and solved in the United Nations with more democratic and legitimate practices. 
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Study II 
 
Introduction 
In the first study of this project, I focused solely on the MENA states and different aspects of 
their identity within the United Nations system. While there were overall patterns found in the 
General Debate speeches, rotation of the Security Council seat, and in peacekeeping 
contributions, there are other parts of the UN system that can be furthered studied. MENA’s 
identity appears to be unique, but this cannot be determined by only looking at MENA states. 
This study expands to the Permanent Five states on the Security Council, United States (U.S.), 
United Kingdom (U.K.), Russia, France, and China, to compare with MENA’s identity. To 
determine if MENA’s identity is unique, General Debate speeches for the P5 were analyzed 
using the same methodology as Study 1. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission was also 
analyzed to further highlight the dominance of the powerful states, and the unrepresentativeness 
of the UN structure, especially towards MENA. 
 This research uses specific MENA state case studies to highlight functioning structural 
norms within the United Nations, which may not allow for unique identities. While the idea of 
states’ images is an underlying theme in the first study, I will discuss how this theme relates to 
state actions in this study. In the previous section, I found general patterns and themes of the 
MENA states in the United Nations, however, more specific and empirical case studies were 
necessary for this project. The case studies of the Morocco, and Saudi Arabia demonstrate the 
structural limitations that states face within the UN system. The case study on Morocco focuses 
on Security Council meeting topics as well as Morocco’s counterterrorism involvement, while 
the case study on Saudi Arabia focuses on its denial of the Security Council seat and 
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involvement on the Human Rights Council. In this part, I seek to address topics that will expand 
on and potentially question the results from the first study.  
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Norms in the United Nations 
In this study I will explore the concept of norms within the UN system. There are two previous 
case studies focused on UN norms: weapons treaties and human rights. They both focus on the 
idea of norms being embedded in the UN system by way of these different topics. Teal Buckner 
Lowring cites in his case study that norms can be identified “‘by looking at the consistent 
behavior of states’” (Hurrell 2007). David B. Steele also discussed a similar definition of norms, 
in that they come into being by “usage and general acceptance” (Steele, 2007).  While a lot of 
literature focuses on the United Nations setting international norms outside of the organization, 
there is not much, if any, literature on norms inside of the United Nations, which is one of the 
ideas in which I focus for this study. These concepts were necessary to provide background of 
the United Nations as a norm-setting institution. For the purpose of this study, the term 
“structural norms” and “norms” will refer to the idea that norms are often deeply embedded in 
the UN system and function as part of the structure of the United Nations.  
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Methodology 
In this part, the General Debate speech topics for the P5 states were studied using the same 
methodology as for the MENA states. The topics of Palestine, Syria, international security, and 
UN reform were examined to identify a pattern. As in Study 1, I chose the timeframe from 2009 
to 2016. The specifics of this process can be found in the methodology section of Study 1.  
 For the case study focused on Morocco, I completed content analysis of the most recent 
time each North African state, as defined by Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, 
served on the Security Council. The role of the Security Council President is to dictate the 
agenda for one month per term (Daily Programme of Work of the United Nations Security 
Council 2017). The purpose was to look at the meeting topics in order to see if there was a 
pattern of which topics the North African representatives mentioned when they served as 
Security Council President for the month. In one case, the Libyan state representatives served 
Security Council President twice, once in 2008 and once in 2009. The results were compared 
among the North African states, and also to the other states serving at the time. I created a coding 
system for the meeting topics and tallied the number of times topics were mentioned. When each 
state on the Security Council served as President, topics were tallied during that month to see 
how many times states brought up certain issues. The coding scheme is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Coding for Security Council Meeting Topics in Selected Years: 2001, 2004, 2008, 
2009, 2012, and 2016 
 
Issue Meeting Topics 
Issue- Africa • “Peace and security in Africa” 
• “Security Council Mission -- Africa” 
• “Peace consolidation in West Africa” 
• “UN West Africa Office” 
• “The situation in” (any African state) 
• Name of any African state or region 
• “Situation along the borders of” (African states) 
• “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South 
Sudan” 
• Briefing / report by UN leader focused on an African state 
• “International Tribunal- Rwanda” 
• “International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia” 
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to” (any UN 
African Mission) 
• “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police- 
contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex 
II, sections A and B” (any African state) 
Issue- MENA • “The situation in the Middle East” 
• “Middle East Situation” 
• “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian 
question” 
• “Nonproliferation-- Iran” 
• Name of any MENA state 
• “Middle East --” (any MENA state) 
• “The situation in” (any MENA state) 
• “Middle East — UNDOF” or “UNIFIL” 
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to the” (any UN 
MENA mission) 
• “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police- 
contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex 
II, sections A and B”  (any MENA state) 
Issue- international 
security 
• “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” 
• “Non-proliferation” 
• “Maintenance of international peace and security: Nuclear 
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nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament” 
• “Small arms” 
• “Prevention of armed conflicts” 
• “Peace and security” 
• “Peace and security — terrorist acts” 
• “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts” 
• “Maintenance of international peace and security” 
• “Maintenance of peace and security” 
• “Women and peace and security” 
• “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub 
regional organizations in maintaining international peace and 
security” 
Issue- Asia • “Name of any Asian state” 
• “Nonproliferation-- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” 
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to the UN 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste”  
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor” 
• “Report of the Secretary-General — Nepal” 
• “Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for 
United Nations assistance in support of its peace process” 
Issue- Europe • Name of any European state 
• “Situation in” (any European state) 
• “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe” 
• “International Tribunal- Yugoslavia” 
• “International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia” 
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to the (UN 
European Mission)”; “Security Council resolutions 1160 
(1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999) 
- Kosovo” 
Issue- Latin America 
& Caribbean  
• Name of any Latin American / Caribbean state 
• “The situation in” (any Latin American / Caribbean state) 
• “Security Council mission — Haiti” 
• “Diplomatic relations — Brazil” 
• “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent 
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Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
(S/2016/53)” 
Issue- Administrative • “ICJ — Election” 
• “Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice” 
• “Briefing by ICJ President” 
• “Briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security 
Council; Implementation of the note by the President of the 
Security Council (S/2010/507)” 
• “Security Council - working methods” 
• “Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the 
General Assembly” 
• “Wrap-up discussion on the work of the Security Council for 
the month of” (insert month) 
• “Annual report of the Security Council to the General 
Assembly” 
• “Appointment of Secretary-General” 
• “Tribute to Secretary General” 
• “Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations” 
Issue- General 
Peacekeeping (not 
country specific) 
• “Post-conflict peacebuilding” 
• “Peacekeeping operations” 
• “United Nations peacekeeping operations” 
• “HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations” 
• “Peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting 
security sector reform” 
• “Role of civil society in post-conflict peace-building” 
• “Peace-building” 
• “Role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-
conflict peace-building” 
• “Meeting with countries contributing troops to the United 
Nations Disengagement Observer Force”; “Strengthening 
cooperation with troop-contributing countries” 
Issue- Other • “Children and armed conflict” 
• “Civilians in armed conflict” 
• “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” 
• “Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed 
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conflict” 
• “Respect for international humanitarian law” 
• “Nobel Peace Prize” 
• “Sanctions” 
• “General issues relating to sanctions” 
• “Briefing by UN High Commissioner for Refugees” 
Source: UN Security Council Meeting Records: 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2016  
 
 Specifically regarding certain meeting topics, if two different states were brought up, for 
instance, “International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia,” both regions mentioned (in this case 
Africa and Europe) received tallies. However, with a topic such as “Peace and security in 
Africa,” only the “Issue- Africa’ category received a tally, not the “Issue- International Security” 
because the regional focus was most important for this study. Any mention of a state, region, or 
continent, in a meeting topic was categorized under that regional issue. The same boundaries for 
MENA as described in the first study apply to this categorization as well. For the other regions, 
the following boundaries apply: 
 
Africa: All states on the African continent minus the North African states of Morocco, Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt 
Europe: All states in Western and Eastern Europe, including Turkey 
Asia: All states east of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Latin America and Caribbean: All states south of Mexico, including the Caribbean islands 
  
 I calculated the number of topics for each state who served as Security Council President 
were calculated, and the percentages of each state out of the total number of topics. Tables 
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including all Security Council meeting data broken down in the selected years can be found in 
the Appendix.  
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 General Debate: The Permanent Five Members  
The conclusion of the first study of MENA states’ participation in the General Assembly Debates 
was that there is a distinct pattern of MENA-region specific topics brought up, which indicates a 
regional identity. However, this pattern of issue prioritization was not compared to any states 
outside of MENA to see if this may be a general pattern. For this comparison, I chose the 
Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council and used the same methodology to 
analyze the General Assembly Debate transcripts during the same timeframe. The P5 were 
chosen because they are the biggest decision-makers in the Security Council and some of the 
most involved states in the United Nations and around the world. The logic was if the MENA 
issues are important enough to be discussed by the P5, who have many interests around the 
world, then these are issues that states outside of MENA region also find important. This 
comparison is done to test the analysis of the MENA identity as “unique” based on the 
prioritization of regional topics. 
 Also, as the most powerful states, the P5 are able to influence international events more 
than others by their veto power on Security Council resolutions and monetary contributions 
around the world. Essentially, their views impact UN action the most of any states, and therefore 
it is interesting to see what issues they prioritize. The P5 is also an interesting group to look at 
because they do not necessarily have a unified stance on issues such as Palestine and Syria, 
whereas the MENA states generally do. As with the MENA states before, the main topics that 
were examined in the General Assembly Debate transcripts for the P5 were the Palestinian 
Conflict, the Syrian Conflict (2012-on), International Security, and UN reform.  
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Palestine 
In the MENA study, the Palestinian Conflict was the strongest and most unified issue, however, 
based on the findings below, there was not as strong of a pattern for the P5.  
 
Table 8: P5 States’ Discussion of Palestinian Conflict in General Debate, 2009-2016 
 
State / Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
U.S. x x x x x x  x 
Russia  x x x x x x   
U.K. x x x x x    
France x x x x x   x 
China   x x x x   
  Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 - 2016 
 
 While in most years, the issue of Palestine was discussed by more than half of the group, 
and in the instances of 2011, 2012, and 2013, the every state discussed them. Despite the varying 
views from the P5 that I will discuss next, it is important to note the difference in perspective of 
this issue from the MENA states to the P5. While for most of the MENA states the issue of 
Palestine is an issue of recognition and social justice, the P5 states come from a conflict 
resolution and containment perspective. Although this conflict is prioritized by the P5, the states 
often do not discuss the situation in the same manner as the MENA states in the General Debate. 
The results do indicate a pattern, although it is not as strong as the MENA states during the same 
timeframe.  
 The U.S. and Russian state delegations mentioned Palestine the most of the P5. This 
could be explained by the historic involvement of the U.S. and Russia as members of The 
Quartet on the Middle East. The U.S. proposed a two-state solution, with the states living side-
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by-side, in every year studied. U.S. President Obama expressed support for both sides of the 
Conflict, but often reiterated its commitment to Israel and Israel’s security (Obama 2009-2014). 
In 2016, he stated “Israelis and Palestinians will be better off if Palestinians reject incitement and 
recognize the legitimacy of Israel, but Israel recognizes that it cannot permanently occupy and 
settle Palestinian land” (Obama 2016). So although there is commitment to a two-state solution, 
President Obama emphasized the U.S.’ relations with Israel. The Russian state representatives 
also brought up Palestine the most, and were the only state to continuously prioritize the need to 
mobilize the Quartet. This was seen in 2009 and 2013 (Medvedev 2009) and (Lavrov 2013).  
 Although the European Union is a member of the Quartet, the U.K., France, and China 
also are not as direct of players in the coalition. UK representatives David Cameron and Nick 
Clegg showed support for a two-state solution to the conflict, which was framed as pretty neutral 
to both sides, but in 2011 Cameron showed strong support for a Palestinian state (Cameron 2011 
and 2012) and (Clegg 2013). French President Hollande stressed the importance of starting peace 
talks again in 2012 and 2013, which was very different from his predecessor’s message in 2011, 
where he said that the solution was up to Israel and Palestine, but other states should help a little 
(Sarkozy 2011) and (Hollande 2012 and 2013).  
 China has mentioned the Palestinian Conflict the least of the P5. The Chinese 
representatives have been as inconsistent about its dialogue of the Palestinian Conflict as it has 
mentioned the conflict in the General Debate over the years. For example, in 2012, Minister 
Jiechi showed support for Palestine at the General Debate, whereas in 2013, Minister Yi did not 
talk about China’s stance on the issue, but in 2014 called for a ceasefire, and for Israel to stop the 
blockade on Palestinian territories (Jiechi 2012) and (Yi 2013 and 2014). This inconsistency of 
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mentions about the conflict may be because of China’s geographical distance and lack of 
involvement in the issue of Palestine.  
 However, there is one disparity in 2015, where none of the P5 mentioned the Palestinian 
issue. The P5 state representatives focused more on the Middle East generally in their General 
Debate speeches in this year. This could possibly be because of the escalating nature of the 
Conflict. Another reason may be because the last time the Quartet on the Middle East met was in 
May 2015, and soon afterward Special Envoy Tony Blair resigned, whom many critics thought 
was ineffective in the negotiations (Black and Beaumont 2015). Perhaps the silence on the 
Palestinian issue by the P5 was due to the failures of the Quartet that previous May. The 
prioritization of the Palestinian Conflict did not prove to be as strong of a pattern for the P5 
states as it did for the MENA states, however, there is still a present pattern. 
 
Syrian Conflict   
The Syrian Conflict was another consistent issue prioritized by the MENA region during the 
General Assembly Debates, so it is necessary to compare to the P5 to see if this is unique to the 
MENA region, or a common pattern among other state members. 
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Table 9: P5 States’ Discussion of Syrian Conflict in General Debate, 2012-2016 
 
State / Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
U.S. x x x x x 
Russia  x x x x x 
U.K. x x x x x 
France x x x x x 
China x x x  x 
   Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 - 2016 
  
 Compared to the topic of the Palestinian Conflict, the Syrian Conflict has a much 
stronger pattern of mentions by the P5 states. Although the time frame is shorter, the P5 all 
mentioned Syria once the conflict started escalating. This makes sense seeing as almost every P5 
state is involved in the conflict, in some capacity. It is also not surprising that China was the only 
P5 state not to mention Syria during the chosen timeframe, seeing as China is not as directly 
involved as the other P5 members, but this only occurred once.  
 There is a wide range of discussion and views of the Syrian Conflict across the P5 states. 
President Obama called for an end to the President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in 2012 (Obama 
2012). In 2015, President Obama focused more on defeating the Islamic State, but stated the 
need for a political transition (Obama 2015). As Russia is a long ally of the Syrian government, 
it was seen in 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a ceasefire in Syria, and 
in 2013, recognized that the Syrian Conflict was a problem, but there needed to be evidence that 
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chemical weapons were used (Lavrov 2012 and 2013). In 2016, he also praised the Russian 
military’s assistance, which kept the Syrian government in control and prevented collapse of the 
state (Lavrov 2016).  
 The U.K. and French representatives took strong stances towards removing President 
Assad year after year. In 2012, Prime Minister Cameron stated that Syria’s future “ is a future 
without Al-Assad” (Cameron 2012). Secretary of State Philip Hammond in 2015 talked about 
Syria in more long-term dialogue, stating the need for political settlement after Assad and defeat 
of ISIS, and what it will take to rebuild Syria (Hammond 2015). President Hollande of France 
expressed outward support for the Syrian rebels in 2012 and 2014, and in 2015, stated that 
President Assad “is at the origin of the problem; he cannot be part of the solution” (Hollande 
2012, 2014 and 2015). Lastly, the Chinese representatives talked about the Syrian Conflict 
generally. In 2013, Minister of Affairs Wang Yi stated a need for a ceasefire, but did not mention 
specific parties involved (Yi 2013).  In 2016, Premier of China’s state Council, Li Keqiang, 
ascertained that Syria was a political conflict with a political solution involving all players 
(Keqiang 2016). Despite the varying views and proposed solutions to the Syrian Conflict among 
the P5 states, the findings show that the Syrian Conflict is a priority the P5 as well and as the 
MENA states.   
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International Security  
 A commitment to international security shows a similar pattern of the Syrian Conflict: no 
less than 4 out of 5, or 80%, of the P5 member states, brought up this topic each year in 2009 - 
2016. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, it is the P5’s responsibility to lead 
efforts in the maintenance of international peace and security, so this pattern is unsurprising. 
 
UN Reform  
 As I found in the MENA states analysis, advocating for UN reform was a weaker pattern, 
however, I believe this is for different reasoning. There were not many MENA states that 
brought up reform in the General Debates in 2009 - 2016, which I attributed to the difficulty and 
unlikeliness of UN reform to occur. For these states, there was often a call for more fair 
representation on the Security Council, or re-structuring of the United Nations, to better reflect 
the world now. Similarly, a weak pattern was also found with the P5 states, where the norm was 
50% or less of the P5 mentioning a need for reform.  
 While the proposed reforms were similar to the MENA states, I would argue that the P5 
do not bring up UN reform often because the current system and structure favors them. By 
adding more states to the Security Council, the P5’s dominance and power in the body could be 
diluted and perhaps undermined. To further illustrate this point, the U.S.’ representative 
President Obama did not mention UN reform once between 2009 and 2016, and was the only P5 
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state to do so. The United Nations and post-Cold War world order favors the U.S. as the most 
powerful state in the world. The U.S. most likely would not want anything to change as the 
current system fits its interests. This result relates back to Zweifel’s argument that the United 
Nations, especially the Security Council, was not meant to be democratic or representative 
(2006). Although this pattern was inconsistent among the P5, it makes sense that UN reform is a 
less-discussed topic with these specific states. 
 
General Debate Results 
The overall results were that MENA and the P5 both consistently prioritized the Palestinian and 
Syrian Conflicts, with MENA prioritizing Palestine slightly more often and the P5 prioritizing 
Syria slightly more often. The P5 focused on international security topics more frequently than 
MENA, and both MENA and the P5 states infrequently mentioned UN reform. Although the 
comparison was not perfect due to the different sizes of the two groups studied, the general 
patterns were more important than the specific ratio between the two groups. From these 
findings, it could be concluded that claiming the MENA region’s identity is unique based on 
General Assembly Debates is not true. As was found, states outside of the region also prioritized 
issues in the MENA region, proving that this is not a MENA-specific indicator of regional 
identity.  
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 The expansion of this study to the P5 states provided a different conclusion than was 
found in the original study of the MENA region only. Despite the conclusion that the MENA 
identity is not as unique as was originally thought, I believe a MENA seat is still necessary for 
the Security Council. Although the P5 do prioritize these MENA conflicts almost as often as the 
MENA states themselves in the General Debates, the conflicts still continue without resolution or 
effective action from the Security Council. Although it cannot be said that the MENA states 
would bring a unique identity to the Security Council based on the prioritization of these issues, 
it could be said that recognized MENA representation is still needed to reinforce the importance 
of bettering these still-unsolved conflicts in the Security Council.  
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Peacebuilding Commission 
The Peacebuilding Commission is also an important and powerful agency in the United Nations. 
The goal of the Peacebuilding Commission is to delegate a separate body to make decisions, 
develop strategies, and make recommendations to UN bodies and outside players, about post-
conflict peacebuilding (“United Nations Peacebuilding Commission” 2017). In Moroccan 
representative Mr. Taib Fassi Fihri’s Security Council bid during the 2011 General Debate, he 
cited Morocco’s involvement in the Peacebuilding Commission as a worthy attribute for election 
to the Security Council (Fihri 2011). Taking this into consideration, it still seems that the 
membership structure of this body is flawed, especially for MENA representation.  
 According to the resolution which created the Peacebuilding Commission, the 
Organizational Committee states were determined by various bodies: Seven states from the 
Security Council and Economic and Social Council, respectively, five states who contributed the 
most to the budget, five states who contributed the most peacekeeping troops and police, and 
seven nonpermanent states (“United Nations Official Document” 2017). While the resolution 
was updated in 2005 to make terms for all member states two years, and emphasized the need for 
representation from states in regions that will be discussed by the Peacebuilding Commission, 
there are still aspects that are not as representative as they could be (“United Nations Official 
Document” 2017).  
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 Although the Peacebuilding Commission members are elected from different bodies with 
different procedures, there is still continuity in who dominates. The Security Council votes on 
seven members, and the permanent and nonpermanent members alike can vote for the 
Organizational Committee members. So it is not surprising that the P5 states almost always take 
five out of seven spots on the Peacebuilding Committee from the Security Council (“United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission” 2017). As was discussed in the previous section, the P5 
states already have much influence with resolutions, major UN decisions, and having their voices 
heard, and they also are able to influence the Organizational Committee as well. 
  Focusing on MENA representation, Egypt is the only state in the previously defined 
MENA region elected to the Organizational Committee (“United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission” 2017). As has been seen before, Egypt has served the most times on the Security 
Council, and contributes some of the highest number of peacekeeping troops, of the MENA 
states. While these are necessary attributes to be elected, there are other MENA states that should 
also represent the region as well. MENA is the only geographical region represented by one state 
on the Organizational Committee. The data are shown below: 
 
MENA: Egypt 
Latin America / Caribbean: Colombia, El Salvador, México, Uruguay, and Argentina  
Eastern Europe: Montenegro, Estonia, Russia 
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Asia: Indonesia, China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Republic of Korea  
Africa: Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda 
Western Europe and Other: France, United Kingdom, United States, and Belgium 
 
 Independent of the P5 states, many of the other states are some of the most powerful 
states in their respective regions, like Egypt. Other states that may be categorized similarly are 
Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and South Africa. While the 
representation for MENA and many smaller, less powerful states, is lacking, the representation 
for Africa is necessary, especially since all of the states currently on the Peacebuilding 
Commission agenda are African states (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Central African Republic) (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2017). While it is 
unknown if the lack of representation from the MENA states comes from a lack of interest or 
resources, there still seems to be a problem of powerful states participating, and potentially 
domination, many aspects of the United Nations. Additionally, as will be seen in the next 
section, other aspects of the United Nations also focus heavily on Africa, and the Peacebuilding 
Commission is part of these norms.  
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MENA State Case Studies 
The following section examines norms, representativeness, and how these play into a state’s 
projected image. The case studies of Morocco and Saudi Arabia will show how the certain 
limitations listed previously restrict state behavior and identity. This is to expand on what was 
found in Study 1, where it was found that MENA regional identity is present based on the chosen 
vehicles for research.  
 This section also addresses certain states’ involvement in the United Nations and how 
this contributes to the idea of how factors outside of the United Nations can affect actions within 
the UN system. There is further analysis done about if the norms and structures of the United 
Nations weaken its representativeness and legitimacy, which was also focused on in Study 1. 
Specific states are used to take a more focused and in-depth look, whereas before the region was 
looked at more generally.  
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Morocco  
The Moroccan delegation is highly involved in U.N. initiatives, especially involving 
counterterrorism efforts. Morocco was the Chair of the Counter Terrorism Committee of the 
United Nations in 2013, and a member of both the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force, as well as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  
 In addition, Morocco hosted the United Nations Global Forum Countering Terrorism 
workshop in 2012, and also hosted the first meeting for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism in its capital, Rabat, in 2006. Morocco is clearly promoting its commitment to 
counterterrorism, not to mention serving as a partner to several European states and the U.S. in 
intelligence and security efforts outside of the United Nations. In 2015, a UN Human Rights 
Council report recognized Morocco’s intelligence agency as the most powerful in MENA, and 
commended its effectiveness of preventing terrorist attacks (Morocco World News 2015). In the 
2011 session of the General Assembly Debate, Taïb Fassi Fihri, Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation of Morocco, advocated for Morocco to serve on the Security Council in the 2012- 
2013 session.   
 Fihri cited Morocco’s contributions to peacekeeping, as well as ambitions to support 
areas outside of MENA such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific, as evidence of Morocco’s 
suitability for the position (2011). Due to this demonstration of commitment, along with 
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consistent contributions of peacekeeping troops, it was originally thought that the member states 
rewarded Morocco with a Security Council bid in 2011.  
 However, after studying the pattern of the “rotating Arab Seat,” it seemed only natural 
that Morocco would serve on the Security Council at that time because it was the state’s “turn.” 
On the other hand, the Southern Provinces in Morocco have long been a source of conflict 
between the Moroccan government and the United Nations, and around the same time, the 
situation was not improving. Morocco’s election to the Security Council despite this violation of 
upholding peace and security could indicate that structural norms can also benefit the MENA 
states too. As discussed before, the North African states have a consistent pattern of rotation, so 
it could be said that Morocco would have been elected to the Security Council anyways since it 
was its turn. This demonstrates how overarching norms in the United Nations may control states’ 
actions. This case explores the ideas of norms through a focus on Morocco and the North African 
states. 
 
Southern Provinces  
The Southern Provinces in Morocco have long been a topic of contention between the United 
Nations and Moroccan leadership, most recently seen when Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon 
called the Southern Provinces an “occupation” by Morocco, leading to the firing of many UN 
workers by Moroccan leadership (Charbonneau 2016). The United Nations Mission for the 
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Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the Southern Provinces has the goal of 
facilitating a “transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of 
Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco,” since the 
1991 ceasefire agreement (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 2017). 
This has led to conflict between Morocco and the United Nations, as Moroccan leadership 
praised a Security Council approved-initiative to solve the dispute in the General Debates of 
2009 and 2011, but in reality progress has not been made and there is still not a solution (Fihri 
2009 and 2011).  
 While I originally thought that Morocco was elected to the Security Council partially 
because of improvement relating to the Southern Provinces, the norm of election to the Security 
Council for the North African states seems to be strong based on the previously discussed 
pattern. Recently in 2016, it was reported that talks between the United Nations and Morocco 
were in occurrence, and potentially tensions between the two are subsiding, but when Morocco 
was seeking Security Council election in 2011 the conflict was not improving (Charbonneau 
2016).  
 In 2011, MINURSO was renewed by the Security Council, showing that there was no 
resolution to this conflict, and according to Human Rights Watch, is the only peacekeeping 
mission to not have a human rights component, which the Moroccan government has allegedly 
opposed (Human Rights Watch 2012). In 2011, Human Rights Watch also reported that the 
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Moroccan government shut down the Al-Jazeera branch in Morocco due to their coverage of the 
Western Sahara conflict (Human Rights Watch 2012). For the year 2011, Freedom House gave 
the Western Sahara situation the label of “Not Free,” with the worst rankings in the categories of 
civil liberties and political rights, and they cited cases of censorship, and prohibition of freedom 
of press and assembly as evidence for this ranking (“Western Sahara 2012). The Moroccan 
government’s treatment of the Southern Province situation is not in line with the Security 
Council’s mission, and it is surprising based on the long-lasting nature of this conflict that 
Morocco was elected to the Security Council (UN Security Council 2017). At this point, the 
situation in the Southern Provinces was not improving, and it seems as if it continues to be an 
issue. If the North African rotation did not have the current pattern, perhaps Morocco would not 
be elected to the Security Council or confirmed due to this United Nations-involved conflict.  
 While in the first study, the focus was on how dividing MENA is not good for the states, 
this study examines how the current system may benefit the MENA states. The situation in the 
Southern Provinces is clearly not an example of Moroccan government following the mission of 
the Security Council because the unrest in the Southern Provinces could contribute to the 
already-present security threats in the area (Fourth Committee 2017). The fairness of the Security 
Council rotation in the North African states allowed Morocco to be elected to the Security 
Council despite this issue. This case also shows how issues outside of the United Nations 
systems may not influence relations with states as much as one may think. As mentioned before, 
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this long-contested conflict does not seem to influence the system of election to the Security 
Council. Further flaws in the UN system involving elections will be seen in the following case 
study as well. 
 
Security Council Meeting Results  
 Previously, elections to the Security Council and General Debate transcripts have been 
examined for patterns of a unified and distinct MENA identity. Following Morocco’s election to 
the Security Council, which as discussed before, may have been more a cause of structural norms 
rather than merit, it seemed that Security Council meeting topics could also be an indicator of 
this identity as well.  
 Focusing on Morocco and the other North African states, I looked at the last time each of 
the state representatives served on the Security Council, and what topics headlined the meetings 
they led as Security Council President, compared with the other states on the Security Council at 
the time. The position allows the representative to set the agenda and control the conversation. 
My expectation for this research was to find that Morocco and the North African states as a 
group would bring up topics about MENA and international security more often than states 
outside of the region. The codebook in the Methodology section shows how the different 
meeting topics are categorized, and the breakdown of the different topics by Security Council 
session can be found in the Appendix.  
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 A major pattern I looked for was if the North African states focused on topics related to 
Africa or MENA more. I expected to find, as I did with the General Assembly Debates, that 
topics of MENA, especially those involving security issues, would be brought up more 
consistently.  
 I started with Morocco, who has a clear focus on international security and representing 
the Arab World by vying for the rotating Arab Seat. When the Moroccan representative served as 
Security Council President in December 2012, it was found that more meetings were focused on 
African topics, which were 8 out of 21 meetings (38%). In comparison, the President focused 
only 3 out of 21(about 14%) meeting topics about MENA issues, and only 2 out of 21 meetings 
about general issues related to international security (10%). These findings were surprising, as I 
expected the Moroccan representative would bring up MENA and international security more, 
especially seeing as MENA does not have a reserved seat on the Security Council to advocate 
fully for the MENA region.  
 However, these findings alone do not prove underlying norms or a collective pattern 
prevail over states’ own interests. Following this, I looked at when the North African states of 
Libya (January 2008 & March 2009), Tunisia (February 2001), Algeria (December 2004), and 
Egypt (May 2016), the year they were Security Council president within that term, which is 
indicated in parentheses above. Overwhelmingly, the pattern was the same with all of the other 
North African states. The meetings were most often focused on Africa, and less so with MENA 
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and international security. There was as much of a disparity of the Tunisian representative’s time 
as President in February 2001, when African topics headlined 60% of the meetings, MENA 
headlined 7%, and international security 0%, during that month. The rest of the data can be 
found in the Appendix. Based on this strong pattern, it seems that there are collective norms in 
the North African region that have prioritized African issues at Security Council meetings over 
MENA issues.  
 With further research on these Security Council meetings, the pattern of African issues 
being prioritized was also found with the other states serving on the Security Council. While it 
was a demonstrated pattern that African topics were brought up more often than MENA topics 
by Security Council presidents, it goes beyond that. It was found that there is a overall pattern of 
African topics being the focus of meetings for almost all states every year, more than any other 
topics (exact numbers can be seen in the Appendix). While this does not apply to every state, it 
was an overall trend that occurred.  
 This result shows that this collective focus on Africa in Security Council meetings goes 
beyond the North African region, as this applied to almost all states that served. It appears that 
the North African states do not have a distinct identity when looking at the Security Council 
meetings. Rather, it seems that there is an underlying global prioritization of African issues being 
the most vital or pressing to peace and security. Additionally, perhaps African topics are 
discussed more because the region is recognized in the Security Council as one of the major 
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geographical blocs. It can be said that there appear to be norms functioning in the UN system, 
which may affect state’s actions, based on this overall pattern.  
 Turning focus back to Morocco, I noted that Morocco appears to follow norms just the 
same as the other states. While Morocco and the other North African states expressed the 
importance of solving the Palestinian and Syrian issues during the General Assembly Debates 
analyzed from 2009-2016, it would be logical that the state representatives advocate for these 
issues as presidents of the Security Council. This lack of prioritization may indicate further these 
inherent norms, as the Palestinian and Syrian conflicts were consistently brought up by the states 
in the General Assembly Debate, but not as strongly once on the Security Council.  
 Although at first glance, Morocco’s election and participation on the Security Council 
appeared to be an example of a committed state representing the interests of an unrecognized 
region, it may have ended up being a victim to strong, structural norms in the UN system. 
Morocco had proven a commitment to international security with its involvement in other facets 
of the United Nations, but its representative did not focus too often on this topic. Through this 
study of Morocco, it can be seen that norms may be constraints to the North African states and 
influence state action within the UN system. 
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Saudi Arabia 
Historically, Saudi Arabia has been vying for leadership in the Islamic world, usually competing 
with Shi’a religious power Iran in the region (Mabon, 2013, p. 2). Both of these states see each 
other as leaders in the Middle East, and feel threatened by the other. This is not only a 
competition of religious power, but also historical, economic, and political power (Mabon, 
2013). While these tensions are outside of the UN system, Saudi Arabia participates less in the 
UN system than other states, perhaps as a means of showing leadership for the MENA region.  
 However, through further research, it is not necessarily true that Saudi Arabia has chosen 
not to participate in all aspects of the United Nations, but it has chosen not to participate in the 
major bodies of the Security Council and General Debate, which many powerful state leaders 
want to be involved in. There are some occurrences where Saudi Arabia does participate, and I 
argue that this inconsistency may be because Saudi leadership is frustrated with the UN structure 
and whichever image matches their interests at the time.  
 
Absence from General Assembly Debates 
 In the selected years of analysis for the General Assembly debates, Saudi Arabia attended 
only two of the seven sessions. Out of the 22 states studied throughout this project (the MENA + 
P5 states), Saudi Arabia is the only state to be absent from any of the General Assembly Debates. 
When in attendance in 2015, Saudi’s representative, Mr. Adel Ahmed Al-Jubeir, stressed MENA 
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conflicts of Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, non-proliferation in Iran, and terrorism, while ending 
with a need for reform of the United Nations (Al-Jubeir, 2015). This makes Saudi Arabia one of 
two MENA states that year to bring up UN reform (the other being Algeria). In Saudi’s other 
General Assembly Debate appearance in 2012, Saudi leadership mentioned UN reform, most 
likely because of frustration with the UN structure (Abdulaziz 2012). It was seen before that the 
Security Council structure recognizes the power of the P5 states. UN Secretary-General Antonio 
Gueterres called Saudi Arabia “an important pillar of stability in the region and in the world as 
well as a key global player and a key pillar of multilateralism.” However, the structure of the 
United Nations does not favor all states, no matter how powerful they may be. This concept can 
be seen in the following section.  
 
Denial of Security Council Seat 
 Saudi Arabia ran for election to the UN Security Council for the 2012 - 2013 session, and 
won the seat. This would have been Saudi Arabia’s first time serving on the Security Council. 
However, Saudi Arabia’s leadership ended up denying the seat, stating its reasons for denial in a 
letter to the United Nations available on the UN website (Al-Mouallimi 2013). This was the first 
time a state has ever won election to the Security Council, and subsequently denied the seat. In 
the letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia stated that the “...mechanisms of 
action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties 
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and assuming its responsibilities towards preserving international peace and security as required” 
(Al-Mouallimi 2013). The representative also discussed long-standing conflicts in the region: the 
Palestinian cause, presence of weapons of mass destruction in MENA, and the Syrian Conflict, 
as instances of “the Security Council’s inability to carry out its duties and assume its 
responsibilities” (Al-Mouallimi 2013). The statement ended with the Saudi Arabian 
representative stating the Kingdom’s “historical responsibilities towards its people,” (“people” 
meaning Arab and Islamic nations) (Al-Mouallimi 2013).  
 An analysis of this letter, combined with the absences from the General Assembly 
Debates, draws several conclusions. First, Saudi Arabia is frustrated by the structure and norms 
of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, relating to its capacity and ability to solve 
problems in the MENA region. Second, by denying to sit on the major decision-making body of 
the United Nations, Saudi Arabian leadership is choosing not to participate in UN actions to help 
MENA, but may think that it can do more without the United Nations. Third, the government of 
Saudi Arabia is essentially protesting the ineffectiveness of the United Nations for the MENA 
region with its absence, as opposed to voicing these concerns and critiques through participation. 
Lastly, as one of the major powers in the MENA region, it seems that Saudi Arabian leadership 
may feel a duty to not be part of a body that does not help their region and people.  
 Due to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, Saudi Arabian leadership may have taken this 
opportunity to assert its commitment to MENA by making an unprecedented statement. I think 
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the Saudi Arabian government made this decision because they wanted to project the image of 
regional leadership. It has been observed by some analysts of leadership in the MENA region 
that the Saudi Arabian government has been taking a more assertive approach to its leadership to 
fill a “perceived vacuum,” especially through military action, which is likely stimulated by the 
threat of Iran’s leadership (Shanahan 2015).  
 This assertive approach to leadership can also be seen in the denial of the Security 
Council seat. Tying in the idea of norms, the structure and norms of the United Nations may 
have compromised Saudi Arabia’s perceived ability to keep up the image of being a leader in 
MENA if they had taken the Security Council seat, which may be why they chose to deny it. The 
issue of norms was found to be a problem with the previous case study of Morocco and the other 
North African states, where states may not have been able to focus on topics they wanted. Saudi 
Arabia’s chosen absence could be not only a sign that norms do have a role in the UN system, 
but also that state’s roles outside of the United Nations can impact their actions within the 
system.  
 
Human Rights Council Election 
Similar to the Security Council, the Human Rights Council is also an organization that does not 
recognize MENA as a region in its elections and representation. The role of the Human Rights 
Council is “strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for 
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addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations…” (“Welcome to 
the Human Rights Council” 2017). These 47 states are voted onto the Human Rights Council by 
the General Assembly, and are voted on by the following standards in waves: 
 
African States: 13 seats 
Asia-Pacific States: 13 seats 
Latin American and Caribbean States: 8 seats 
Western European and Other States: 7 seats  
Eastern European States: 6 seats 
 
 Saudi Arabia was recently re-elected to one of four spots to the Human Rights Council to 
serve until 2019, representing the Asia group (Human Rights Watch 2016). There were only four 
states running, and China, Japan, and Iraq were the other states that ran and were elected (Human 
Rights Watch 2016). This is an interesting election seeing as Saudi Arabia is not known for 
human rights. In 2017, Freedom House ranked Saudi Arabia “7” on its “Freedom of the World” 
Rating scale, with a status of “Not Free,” which is the worst score a state can earn (“Saudi Arabia 
| Country Report | Freedom in the World). Saudi Arabia has also received criticism for arrests of 
political opposition, flawed trials, and bombing campaigns in Yemen, all of which have 
contributed to Saudi’s low human rights record (Human Rights Watch 2017). According to the 
77 
 
 
World Economic Forum gender gap rankings, Saudi Arabia ranked 134 out of 145 countries 
(The Global Gender Gap Report 2015). As Human Rights Watch noted, despite this reputation, 
Saudi Arabia was elected due to the uncontested nature of the election, whereas Russia, who was 
in a contested election and has a slightly better human rights reputation, was not elected (Human 
Rights Watch 2016).  
 This shows that there are flaws in the elections to the Human Rights Council, if states 
with terrible human rights reputations can be elected to a global body that oversees human rights. 
This also raises the question of why Saudi Arabia would want to serve on the Human Rights 
Council, since it would appear upholding of human rights is not seen as a priority. Not only is 
Saudi Arabian delegation participating in the United Nations, but also the delegation is 
participating in a body of the United Nations focused on a topic that Saudi Arabian leadership is 
not known for. Potentially, Saudi Arabia’s representatives want to show the world that they are 
committed to human rights, despite what has been recorded.  
 In looking at the Saudi Press Agency, which was created by the Saudi government and is 
now a “General Commission” overseen by the Minister of Culture and Information for Saudi 
Arabia, there are several press statements that focus on the Saudi Arabian leadership’s 
commitment to human rights (Al-Toraifi 2017). In February 2017, there was a brief press release 
about the President of Human Rights Commission Dr. Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Aiban 
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discussing Saudi Arabia government’s “efforts in supporting human rights issues” with the 
Swedish Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Jan Knutsson (Saudi Press Agency 2017).  
 The function of a press release is to update about an event or issue, usually briefly, and 
that is what the nature of this statement was. This may show that public knowledge of the 
meeting was important, but not necessarily more detail. While this is not known for certain, the 
release is only two sentences, and just informs the reader that the meeting happened and focused 
on human rights. It could be that the point was to show evidence that Saudi Arabia leadership is 
committed to this issue.  
 There was another press statement related to human rights also in early February 2017 
that was longer in nature, which detailed Saudi Arabia and the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation’s affiliated Human Rights Organization agreement to make Saudi Arabia the 
“headquarter host country” for the organization, providing “resources and facilities, to guarantee 
realizing effective performance of the independent body” (Saudi Govt, OIC Human Rights 
Organization Co-sign Headquarters' Accord 2017).  This further shows the Saudi Arabian 
government showing a commitment to human rights through meetings and supporting 
organizations committed to the topic. Sitting on the Human Rights Council could also be a part 
of fostering this public image of commitment to human rights, which benefits Saudi Arabian 
leadership. This is contrasted with Saudi Arabian leadership deciding that absence from the 
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Security Council was the best move for its image then, but election to the Human Rights Council 
provided Saudi Arabian leadership with an opportunity to further this commitment.  
 It is also important to note the structural failure of the elections to the Human Rights 
Council, which allowed a state heavily criticized for its human rights record to sit on an 
organization, which oversees human rights. This ties into the idea of powerful states that have 
the ability to be involved in the United Nations (in Saudi’s cause, when they desire) dominating 
the UN system. While the Human Rights Council members are voted on democratically with a 
number of spots put aside regionally, it should be questioned if it is worth it to allow states like 
Saudi Arabia to serve in the organ.  
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Conclusions of Study 2 
Based on this elaboration from the original case study of the MENA states, I argue that the UN 
system does not allow for a MENA identity as strongly as expected. The prioritization of 
Palestine and Syria, thought to be a MENA-specific pattern in the General Assembly Debates, 
turned out to be a priority to the P5 member states as well. Since the P5 states also highly 
prioritize these MENA conflicts, I question why the Security Council has not passed more 
effective resolutions towards them. There is clearly some disparity, as the P5 always have a 
chance to determine on what the Security Council should focus every term.   
 Looking at vetoes and resolutions on the Security Council related to the Palestinian and 
Syrian Conflicts, and comparing between the MENA and P5 states could expand this research. 
This could be an interesting comparison to see if the P5 and MENA states on the Security 
Council were on the same page about these issues, and could further speak to the dynamic of the 
powerful states. 
 With the case study of Morocco and the North African states in the Security Council, 
common patterns of meeting topics were found between most states that served on the Security 
Council during the selected years. I found no greater prioritization of MENA issues, and there 
was an overall prioritization of African issues by most states during the timeframe, no matter 
what region a state came from. The overwhelming pattern of African topics dominating the 
Security Council may indicate UN norms. It seems too present to just be a coincidence, 
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especially for states very distant from Africa. While there are undoubtedly pressing issues in 
Africa, I question if this pattern causes other issues to be neglected, as the African issues are 
discussed a large portion of the Security Council term. 
 The case study of Saudi Arabia showed two different aspects of the structural constraints 
of the UN; one, how states can be affected by the restrictions, and two, how there are democratic 
elements that can harm the legitimacy of certain UN organs. It seems that state leadership such 
as Saudi Arabia may capitalize on weaknesses of the United Nations to further their own 
leadership in their region to fulfill outside motives. The UN can probably serve as an effective 
platform for states to do this due to its high visibility and widespread involvement. 
 Based on my research, Morocco and Saudi Arabia did not necessarily have the best 
attributes to be respectively elected to the Security Council and Human Rights Council, but yet 
they won these elections. This relates back to the idea of states that have the capability to be 
involved in the United Nations dominating the system. Both Morocco’s Southern Province 
situation and Saudi Arabia’s human rights reputation are clear infractions of the missions of the 
Security Council and Human Rights Council, and yet they were rewarded in the system with 
positions. This truly hurts the legitimacy of these organizations, and the United Nations as a 
whole, as I am sure there are similar infractions in other organs.  
  Perhaps because these infractions occurred outside of the UN system, it did not affect the 
states’ elections within the UN system. This perceived lack of accountability for actions outside 
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of the United Nations could be a flaw of having strong norms and the current system in the 
United Nations. While the previous part explored that the current system of the UN is unfair to 
MENA, the case studies showed ways the MENA states may have benefited from the democratic 
elements in the current system. From this study, it seems that norms within the United Nations 
can become embedded as part of the structure, which may lead to uneven discussion of topics 
and undeserving states earning positions in the United Nations.  
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Conclusion 
While each study provided different results and analysis of the UN structure, I focused on 
common themes of representation and legitimacy throughout the two studies. I found that while 
there are some aspects of the United Nations that are lacking in democratic elements and fair 
representation, such as the Security Council, even the aspects that have fair democratic 
procedures, such as the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council, are harmed by 
the structure of the United Nations, and could be deemed as illegitimate.  
 There is an overall problem of states using different UN organs as a platform to portray 
an image, and once actually being in a decision-making position, being unable to act in the 
manner they may have wished. This can be seen with the difference in MENA and P5 states 
consistently prioritizing topics such as the Palestinian and Syrian conflicts in the General Debate, 
but once elected to the Security Council, a body that may allow these states to have a role in 
ameliorating these conflicts, they either cannot or do not.  
 While I discussed the role of norms on the Security Council, I think there is also a 
disparity of how these states want to be viewed on the world stage, but then how these states act 
once behind closed doors and matched against other powerful states. All of this makes me 
question the legitimacy of the General Debate in determining if the issues discussed are truly 
what UN state members prioritize, or just what is convenient for them to show they are 
prioritizing. A regional leader like Saudi Arabia may have an interest in appearing highly 
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engaged in solving the conflicts of Palestine and Syria, but when given the chance to potentially 
make a difference in UN actions towards these conflicts on the Security Council, it was denied 
by Saudi leadership to maybe suit their own interests. 
 As mentioned before with the MENA seat, the United Nations is not an adaptable 
organization because of its difficult reform process. Looking further, another failure is the 
precedent-setting nature of every decision and structural reform made to the United Nations. 
Instead of taking things on a situational basis, the United Nations is expected to make a decision 
once and uphold this no matter what. While this is beneficial for consistency within the system, 
this is not beneficial when Saudi Arabia is elected to the Human Rights Council. In this very 
election, Russia leadership lost the spot on the Human Rights Council because their regional 
grouping had a competitive election, and the state does not have a great reputation for human 
rights.  
 However, a state like Saudi Arabia with a worst reputation for human rights was able to 
be elected because its regional grouping had a non-competitive election for the four determined 
regional spots. This is an instance where ideally, the Human Rights Council should have been 
able to limit the number of spots, or deny Saudi Arabia from serving. Saudi Arabian leadership 
should probably not be determining policy related to human rights, and organs within the United 
Nations should be able to have this autonomy. This is the same with the case of Morocco being 
elected to the Security Council with the persisting Southern Provinces conflict. It is unfortunate 
that either of these states, and others in different UN organs, are able to serve as decision makers 
and influence stakeholders on issues they themselves are struggling with.  
 This leads to how another major structural flaw is the United Nations being based on 
voluntary governance and how this affects its representation and legitimacy. No one can control 
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who participates in the UN organs because everything is voluntary. If a state does not have the 
capability or desire to serve in any of the organs, then they will not. This is partially what allows 
powerful states to dominate many organs in the United Nations. This also means that the United 
Nations does have to sacrifice some legitimacy of its organs due to this structure. A certain 
number of representatives for UN organs will be elected regardless, and if it is a noncompetitive 
election, it may not matter if they are qualified or even deserving of these positions. The 
rigidness of the UN structure not only hurts the legitimacy of the UN organs, but also can hurt 
the legitimacy of its democracy. 
 While I originally thought that more democratic elements should be included in the 
United Nations, after studying different UN organs, it is hard to fully advocate for this. I still 
believe the recognized, consistent MENA seat, along with other sub regional seats, should be 
added to the Security Council in the best interest of the organ as legitimately representing the 
diversity of the world today, but there is a problem of almost undeserving or unqualified state 
members being elected. It is unfair for these states to be allowed to represent stakeholders’ 
interests and decide their fates, when these state leaders have not demonstrated their ability to do 
so. I argue that while democracy for increased and diverse representation is important for the 
United Nations’ legitimacy as a world government, there perhaps should be more flexibility in 
the structure to ensure the character of this representation matches the mission of the United 
Nations. 
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Appendix 
 
Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2001 
 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Afric
a 
Topic 
MEN
A 
Topic  
international 
security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Total 
South 
America/ 
Caribbean 
Topic 
Othe
r 
Topic 
Administrat
e 
  
 
  
  
Mali December 7 1   2 3         
Jamaica November 14 4 1 3 3   4    
Ireland October 9 1 1 4 3   2     
France September 13   1 2 5   1     
Colombia August 1 3 4 1 2         
China July 4 2   3 3         
Bangladesh June 7 2 4 2 5        
U.S. May 7 1   2            
U.K. April 3     1 4   2      
Ukraine March 7 6 3   10          
Tunisia February 9 1     2         
Singapore January 7 1   3 5         
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2001 
 
 
President's 
Country 
Total % 
Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % international 
security 
Mali 50% 7% 0% 
Jamaica 45% 13% 3% 
Ireland 41% 5% 5% 
France 57% 0% 4% 
Colombia 8% 25% 33% 
China 31% 15% 0% 
Bangladesh 29% 8% 17% 
U.S. 70% 10% 0% 
U.K. 30% 0% 0% 
Ukraine 27% 23% 12% 
Tunisia 60% 7% 0% 
Singapore 33% 5% 0% 
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2004 
 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Africa 
Topic 
MEN
A 
Topic 
internationa
l security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Total 
South 
America/ 
Caribbea
n 
Topic 
Othe
r 
Topic 
Administ
e 
 
 
 
  
  
Algeria  December 8 3 2       2     
USA November 12 2   4 5 2       
United 
Kingdom October 5 7 5 2 3   2     
Spain September 11 3 2 2   1 1     
Russia August 5 2   2 2          
Romania July 6 3 1 1 3   2      
Philippines June 9 5     6   4     
Pakistan May 4 3 2 5 1   3     
Germany April 1 8 3 1 6 1 1     
France March 8 4 5 2 3          
China February 5 2   1 2 2        
Chile January 2 6 4 1 3   4      
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2004 
 
President's 
Country 
Total % Africa 
discussed 
Total % MENA 
discussed Total % international security 
Algeria  50% 19%  
USA 46% 8%  
United 
Kingdom 20% 28%  
Spain 52% 14%  
Russia 45% 18%  
Romania 38% 19%  
Philippines 36% 20%  
Pakistan 20% 15%  
Germany 5% 36%  
France 36% 18%  
China 42% 17%  
Chile 10% 30%  
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2008 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Afric
a 
Topic 
MEN
A 
Topic 
internationa
l security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Total 
South 
America/ 
Caribbea
n 
Topic 
Othe
r 
Topic 
Administrativ
e 
  
 
  
  
Croatia December 18 9 3 1 6     1   
Costa Rica November 7 2 2 1 2     3    
China October 11 2 2 1 2 3   2   
Burkina 
Faso September 7 2 4 1 3          
Belgium August 5 5 3 2 6     2    
Vietnam July 11 2   4 2   2      
U.S. June 15 5 3 2 4         
U.K. May 5 3 1 1 2   2 1   
South 
Africa April 10 6 3   5 1        
Russia March 5 5 2 4 1          
Panama February 9 1   3 3   2      
Libya January 7 4   1 2          
110 
 
 
 
Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2008
President's 
Country 
Total % 
Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % 
terrorism/international 
security 
Croatia 46% 23% 8% 
Costa Rica 41% 12% 12% 
China 46% 8% 8% 
Burkina 
Faso 41% 12% 24% 
Belgium 22% 22% 13% 
Vietnam 52% 10% 0% 
U.S. 50% 17% 10% 
U..K 29% 18% 6% 
South 
Africa 40% 24% 12% 
Russia 29% 29% 12% 
Panama 50% 6% 0% 
Libya 50% 29% 0% 
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Security Council Meeting  Topics, Session 2009  
 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Africa 
Topic 
MEN
A 
Topic 
internationa
l security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europ
e 
Total 
South 
America/ 
Caribbean 
Topic 
Othe
r 
Topic 
Administra
e 
  
 
  
  
Burkina 
Faso December 18 4 1   4        
Austria November 7 3   1 2   2    
Vietnam October 7 2 2 3 1 1       
U.S. September 5 1 2 1   3        
U.K. August   5 2       1     
Uganda July 14 2 1 3 1         
Turkey June 9 4   3 4   2     
Russia May 8 2   2 3         
Mexico April 9 3 2 2 1 2 2      
Libya March 6 3   2 2 1        
Japan February 3 2   2 3          
France January 8 5   2     3    
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2009 
 
President's 
Country 
Total % 
Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % international 
security 
Burkina 
Faso 62% 14% 3% 
Austria 39% 17% 0% 
Vietnam 39% 11% 11% 
USA 42% 8% 17% 
UK 0% 50% 20% 
Uganda 61% 9% 4% 
Turkey 36% 16% 0% 
Russia 47% 12% 0% 
Mexico 43% 14% 10% 
Libya 43% 21% 0% 
Japan 30% 20% 0% 
France 40% 25% 0% 
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2012 
 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Africa 
Topic 
MENA 
Topic 
Internationa
l security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Topic 
South 
America/ 
Caribbea
n 
Topic 
Othe
r 
Topic 
Administrat
e 
 
 
 
  
  
Morocco December 8 3 2 2 2 0  0    
India November 8 7 3 2 2 0       
Guatemala October 6 2 3 1   2        
Germany September 6 3 1 1   1 2      
France August 2 5     1          
Colombia July 13 7     2         
China June 9 3 3 2     3     
Azerbaijan May 7 4 2   2          
United 
States April 7 8 4 1           
United 
Kingdom March 6 6 1 2   1       
Togo February 9 3 2 3 3 1        
South 
Africa January 5 4 4             
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2012 
 
President's 
Country 
Total % 
Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % international 
security 
Mali 50% 7% 0% 
Jamaica 45% 13% 3% 
Ireland 41% 5% 5% 
France 57% 0% 4% 
Colombia 8% 25% 33% 
China 31% 15% 0% 
Bangladesh 29% 8% 17% 
USA 70% 10% 0% 
UK 30% 0% 0% 
Ukraine 27% 23% 12% 
Tunisia 60% 7% 0% 
Singapore 33% 5% 0% 
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2013 (Control)  
 
President's 
Country Month  
Topic 
Africa 
Topic 
MENA 
Topic 
International 
security 
Topic
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Total South 
America/ 
Caribbean 
Topic 
Other 
Topic 
Administrativ  
  
  
   
France December 10 4 2 1 1        
China November 10 3   1 2         
Azerbaijan October 6 3 2 1   1 1     
Australia September 6 2 2 1            
Argentina August 4 3 2   1 2 1     
U.S. July 14 5 1   2   2      
U.K. June 6 5 4 1 2   1    
Togo May 8 2     2         
Rwanda April 7 6 1            
Russia March 8 3 1 1 3 1        
Republic 
of Korea February 7 3 1       2     
Pakistan January 7 3 3 1 2        
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2013
President's 
Country 
Total % Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % international 
security 
France 50% 20% 10% 
China 59% 18% 0% 
Azerbaijan 35% 18% 12% 
Australia 55% 18% 18% 
Argentina 29% 21% 14% 
U.S. 58% 21% 4% 
United Kingdom 27% 23% 18% 
Togo 57% 14% 0% 
Rwanda 44% 38% 6% 
Russia 47% 18% 6% 
Republic of Korea 50% 21% 7% 
Pakistan 39% 17% 17% 
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Security Council Meeting Topics, 2016 
 
President's 
Country Month 
Topic
Afric
a 
Topic 
MEN
A 
Topic 
internationa
l security 
Topic 
Asia 
Topic 
Europe 
Total South 
America/ 
Caribbean 
Topic 
Other 
Topic 
Administrativ
e 
  
  
   
Spain  December 11 12 3 3 2     2   
Senegal November 8 7 4 1 2     1   
Russia October 4 5 4     3   2    
New 
Zealand September 2 5 2 1   2 1      
Malaysia August 5 5 1   1     2    
Japan July 12 6 1   2     1   
France June 10 7 3 1 2   1     
Egypt May 6 5 3   2   1 2    
China April 12 7 2   1         
Angola March 10 6 3 3   2       
Venezuela February 7 7 2   3   1 1   
Uruguay January 9 3     2 1 1 1    
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2016 
 
 
 
President's 
Country 
Total % 
Africa 
discussed 
Total % 
MENA 
discussed 
Total % international 
security 
Spain 32% 35% 9% 
Senegal 33% 29% 17% 
Russia 22% 28% 22% 
New 
Zealand 15% 38% 15% 
Malaysia 36% 36% 7% 
Japan 52% 26% 4% 
France 38% 27% 12% 
Egypt 32% 26% 16% 
China 52% 30% 9% 
Angola 38% 23% 12% 
Venezuela 32% 32% 9% 
Uruguay 53% 18% 0% 
